trace[s] the steps of how we arrived at the supposed problem in the
which is that we either choose to draw a sharp boundary and resolve its fuziness with a supposed discovery of what e.g. "heap" means, when this is impossible because we cannot get beyond language, or decide that the term (e.g. "heap") makes sense independent of other language games, when language games infect each other, and are only a local victory over vagueness
we cannot isolate necessary and sufficient conditions for the
application of a term or concept, save by making a choice (or by
having a choice foisted upon us by customs and practices surrounding
our particular endeavor), [but that] does not render the term or concept useless,
lacking in sense.
If a limit is indefinite, can be shown to be indefinite, would he
infer that it does not exist?
Of course, Wittgenstein would deny that we can show a boundary is indefinite, anymore than we can discover or isolate a boundary at a specific location.
what we he be able to do with a claim that the absence of
consciousness is vague
Depends on whether it has the same source as the Sorites paradox, which I'd guess is a concealment of how language functions.