Or, then, do all questions involving the substitute for "is true" in some or another truth theory, exist as meaningful questions? So that any of the following is admissible on its own terms (on its own merits):
- "Does S cohere with an ideal set of other sentences/propositions?"
- "Is S the limit of an ideal inquiry?"
- "Is S identical to some fact?" (Maybe have "B" instead, for beliefs, with the possibility of a strong overlap between the inherent content of B and the content of some fact, as with beliefs about beliefs, perhaps.)
- "Is S (or B) constituted by some fact?"
- "Does S satisfy the truth axioms for some axiomatic theory of truth?"
- "S is p?" (instead of, "Is, 'S is p,' true?" for deflationism).
Is it more or less efficient/useful to ask, "Is S true?" instead of whether S satisfies specific substituted characterizations of "is true"? Or then can questions of truth be "paraphrased away" into an ensemble of other such questions, and none of those questions is to be dismissed out of hand a priori (even if some individual S conform to only some of (1) through (6), e.g. perhaps moral claims never substantively correspond to facts but do nontrivially cohere with ideal proposition sets, or whatever)?
Or, to frame the issue I'm having a little differently, can Quine's dictum about logic be expressed as, "Change the metalogic, change the (meta-)subject"? So that coherence theories of truth turn out to not be about truth at all (coherence seems like an outlier when compared to correspondence vs. constitution/identity, while pragmatic/inquiry-based theories can accommodate correspondence).