If Zalta objects exist, would there be a contingently abstract obligation?

Question

One of the posits of Zaltaesque object theory (let's call it that, since there is something vaguely Kafkaesque about logicist realism) is that for every set of assertible encoding relations there is an abstract object that does encode from that set. There is, for example, a round square in the sense that there is abstract object that encodes "being round" and "being square," but this object does not exemplify those two properties jointly, because the exemplification relation sustains exclusive negation.

Perhaps even more oddly, there's an option where there are contingently abstract objects. So suppose that such things are admissible such that we can proclaim the existence of an abstract object that encodes "being an obligation" and "being a contingently abstract object." More finely, gerrymander the Lovecraftian horror of "being an obligation to have the given abstract object be concrete." That is, we imagine that there could be such an awful thing as an obligation to turn some contingently abstract object into a concrete one (or to turn a concrete one into an abstract one!), and the bare conception of this property then must be encoded by some abstract object (since at least one exists for every abstract, encodable property), which means that there would in fact be a contingently abstract object that generates an obligation to make it concrete (or abstract).

Now, waiving the stark absurdity of the above as a disclaimer, is it troubling even internally to the theory of Zaltaesque objects that such an obligation would exist? Can this weird thesis really be inferred from the generally intended meaning of that theory? I admit, it is hard to see how we would be changing abstract (or concrete) objects in a physics-minded sense, but the other option—that there is a standing order for every contingently abstract object, that it either be in the state that it is in or that it be in some other state, with the "decision" of which state it's actually in then either in permanent compliance with or permanent defiance of the coupled imperative—is hardly more appealing to say out loud. Perhaps Kant's talk of timeless choices yet succeeding each other by appearance over time might be adapted to the option, though (there would be (at least) one contingently abstract object that should be concrete and a contingently concrete object that should be concrete, and the initial (atemporal) sin (radical evil) "was" a failure to choose that the one object be in its intended state but our redemption (the "revolution in our hearts") concerns the pure choice to hold the other should-be-concrete object fast).

But here, we run the risk of overcomplicating the radical-evil thesis even worse than Kant did with his noetic levels (the animality-rationality-personality distinction), which themselves already seem in peril of trespassing upon the "unexplainability" factor with respects to noumenal dynamics (especially when equipped with the even more subtle distinction between Wille and Willkür). Regardless, then, however, do the principles from Zalta that are invoked, here, establish the bizarre object in question, becoming candidates for something like a moment of ante rem moral realism even if not contributing substantially (at all!) to reasoning about strictly concrete moral questions?

Answer 1

From my perspective, this line of metaphysical speculation seems far removed from the reality-based investigation of ethics. Debating abstract philosophical puzzles about possible but unfalsifiable objects strikes me as a misguided approach to moral reasoning.

We should be skeptical of claims about strange ontological entities like "contingently abstract obligations" when there is no evidence they actually exist or impact human well-being. Toying with logic does not get us closer to understanding morality.

True moral progress comes from grappling with the actual causes of human and animal suffering, not theoretical abstractions. Philosophy can clarify moral questions, but not answer them apart from science, psychology and history.

Rather than get lost in conceptual labyrinths, we should focus ethical debate on identifiable individual and societal harms, their tangible roots, and authentic ways to prevent them through compassion and justice.

At the end of the day, moral reality is about conscious creatures, their capacity for empathy, and objective facts concerning their thoughts and behaviors in this world. Speculation about platonic forms or possible worlds has little relevance. We must be wary not to confuse thinking for understanding.

In summary, while intellectual creativity has a place, we must remain grounded in common sense and empiricism when it comes to ethics. Moral progress depends on elevating human wisdom and cooperation, not debating esoteric metaphysics. Our shared well-being should be the north star.