Corroborating Dcleve's rightly-headed answer I want to make a fine but significant correction that physicalism can't even in principle account for mind and consciousness for reasons already explored or alluded to in literature on "the hard problem of consciousness", that I briefly summarize here.
Eliminativism somehow pretends something that is there is not there by assuming that consciousness is identical with some brain state or an illusion. But...
Identity theories provide no argument but only assert correlations to be identities, that is, phenomenally distinct data (of neuroscience and of conscious experience) are not actually distinct but the same, which is of course question begging, in addition to contradicting the logical principle of identity of indiscernibles and its opposite non-identity of discernibles.
Illusionist accounts, as I have explained and sustained it elsewhere, lead to logical contradiction, which is due to their mistaking consciousness (for which correspondence is meaningless, and which is rather the ground of all correspondence) with its particular states that can be true or false via correspondence.
Representationalism assumes representations are somehow possible without consciousness which is clearly not, for you can have no representation without being first conscious because all representations occur inside your consciousness. And forget about computer analogies as they are only false analogies. No bunch of electrical charges or frequencies inside a computer converted into pixel symbols on screen represent anything without us consciously reading meanings into those symbols by awareness of our human lingual and/or engineering conventions.
Emergentism can't explain how matter can give rise to something which is ontologically categorically different from matter, or the peculiar feature of the alleged emergent property to subsume everything even its own origin, matter, inside its mysterious subsumptive power.
Epiphenomenalism while not strictly a physicalist position posits consciousness as an idle by-product of the brain machinery but can't explain why should there be such a by-product in the first place, let alone able to produce such peculiar features as unity, subsumptive power, meaning, intentionality, etc.
Idealism, therefore, emerges as the only alternative, after all forms of the diehard physicalism defeated. Now Idealism can actually explain matter, whatever its exact scientific definition, by postulating that all matter are only various determinations of consciousness. The only problem however is that it implies some sort of a subjectivist non-realist demonology, as if our minds (us ourselves actually!) are some self-deceiving supernatural entities that can create and project the phenomenal world before our eyes without it (us!) normally making notice of our entire self-made show!
But a particular form of panpsychism can help us avoid this "crazy" (maybe even logically absurd) scenario, by postulating a universal/cosmic consciousness inside which all determinations understood as "matter" take place giving us the very real physical world, with human mind being some sort of a highly restricted and degraded offshoot of that supreme consciousness that perceives those determinations by partially participating in that higher consciousness.
I have find this hypothesis the only remaining view that is logically consistent, which is really so much because the foremost issue in mind-body relation debates are still the issue of logical consistency. Note that on this account, no datum of experience is ignored or dismissed or reduced, including the reality of the physical world!
With so much resolved, what I still found to be specially reassuring was that this only plausible view has been also empirically corroborated by that single revolutionary work that I have cited in my earlier answers two times already Irreducible Mind by Edward F. Kelly et al. The authors have complied several category of empirical evidence from parapsychology that support the above picture, one that had been already proposed by F. W. H. Myers, a colleague of William James, more than a century ago but simply ignored and forgotten due to the rise of crude behaviorism and its blinding lure!