One expression of this problem is as a matter of metaphysical grounding and a comparison of two levels of questions about causal explanations (so to get at your issue, replace "causal" with "rational" generically):
- X causes Y, Y causes Z, Z causes z, z causes zz, ...
- What is the cause of the whole sequence (1)?
Or then, "What is the reason for the whole series of reasons?" Answers to (2) based on X, Y, Z, z, zz, ... could seem to form a vicious circle; using (2) as an answer to itself is either unwell-formed (as a gesture of thought) or also circular, but trivially so instead of viciously. Note that if we accept the conceptual stability of (2), we can then ask, "What is the cause of/reason for (1) and (2)?" and it would seem that we have lost the point of separating (1) from (2), since we are extending (2) to (3), etc. Usefully enough, however, when it comes to the distinction between second- and third-or-higher-order logic:
... which they round off by noting that "even though higher than second-order logics are strictly speaking stronger than second-order logic no difference can be seen by the usual criteria of strength of expressive power." So when it comes to the question of reasons-metareasons-metametareasons-etc., we would find that there is less of an importance to the (2)/(3) distinction above, than the (1)/(2) distinction; or, then, something about the expanding-circularity process collapses at (2), and then we will be resigned to or offended by (2)-circularity and not have to worry about (n)-circles swallowing logical space like so many overlapping false-vacuum collapses.