In the Transcendental Aesthetic he notes:
... I shall add that the conception of change, and with it the conception of motion, as change of place, is possible only through and in the representation of time; that if this representation were not an intuition (internal) a priori, no conception, of whatever kind, could render comprehensible the possibility of change, in other words, of a conjunction of contradictorily opposed predicates in one and the same object, for example, the presence of a thing in a place and the non-presence of the same thing in the same place. It is only in time that it is possible to meet with two contradictorily opposed determinations in one thing, that is, after each other.
And in the Analytic he picks up the theme again:
... [there is a formulation of the principle that] is affected by the condition of time, and as it were says: "A thing = A, which is something = B, cannot at the same time be non-B." But both, B as well as non-B, may quite well exist in succession. For example, a man who is young cannot at the same time be old; but the same man can very well be at one time young, and at another not young, that is, old. Now the principle of contradiction as a merely logical proposition must not by any means limit its application merely to relations of time, and consequently a formula like the preceding is quite foreign to its true purpose.
Does this mean that, by the word "time," Kant is referring to whatever plays the role of upholding the principle of contradiction when otherwise inconsistent predicates are applied to the same subject? This seems like a role we could at least try to generalize as a concept, so as to have a phrase like, "Something else, not what we refer to by the word 'time,' but which would play a counterpart role if it existed." Or is "time" being fully equated with its transcendental role, in Kant's system, in sustaining the principle of contradiction? I ask because this definition would seem to go both behind and above any of the definitions that seem to figure in questions like, "Is time an illusion?" or, "Is time grounded in something else?"
For how could time be grounded in something else that is yet time-like (quantum fields, say), if time's purpose as a concept is so interwoven with a presumably as-basic-as-can-be principle like that of noncontradiction? Because otherwise, would we have to explain how quantum fields (or whatever) allow for coherently inconsistent predication independent on the existence of time? (I'm not, myself, averse to trying to ground noncontradiction in something else, be it arguments-from-explosions or perhaps necessarily-existing-beings.)