This question is ultimately a follow up to this one
For the context of the question, assume that a metaphysical reality is a reality that can be conceived without contradiction and that these realities are mutually exclusive. For example, “God operating in the world” and “the Christian God operating in the world” are not mutually exclusive. The former is implied by the latter. For example, one kind of reality may involve the Christian God who operates in the world. Or the Islamic God. Or some invisible spaghetti monster running the world. Etc
Let’s say that one argues that assignments of probabilities to different possible realities being true cannot reasonably be assigned. The rationale for this may be that probabilities seem meaningless or that even if they were meaningful, there is no justification to use the principle of indifference for them. The principle of indifference, as a reminder, states that probabilities among propositions with an absence of knowledge should be equiprobable.
If so, does this imply that one cannot think it to be less reasonable to believe that say the Undetectable Flying Spaghetti Monster is real than the Christian God? Presumably, if one did think this, one would be able to justify an epistemic probability that is higher for the Monster than the Christian God. But as mentioned before, one may refuse to do this.
As such, would one be inconsistent if one fails to assign probabilities but also deems it to think that a certain kind of reality is more reasonable to believe than another?