This concerns a problem I myself have with Scheler, and am not sure where to go with it. Scheler argues in On the Eternal in Man that one cannot dismiss religious experience (or as he calls it, "revelatory experience") wholesale. That is, revelatory experiences are sui generis, and are to be judged on their own internal standards, and not to be dismissed on the standards we apply to sensory experiences. His argument is a classic phenomenological move, in treating different kinds of experiences as having their own "sense" or "logic" to them.
The problem is, and this is probably a leftover empiricist bias on my part, are religious experiences really that different from other experiences that we cannot judge religious experiences from a standpoint external to them? My concern is that Scheler is deeming religious experiences as unique and irreducible to any other kind of experience on a priori grounds that may not be formulated clearly enough (at least it isn't crystal clear to me).
However, Scheler has a point: if we dismiss religious experience wholesale, is this move not unlike the radical skeptic who dismisses sensory experiences?
Question: Is there another way between the dichotomy of Scheler's view that religious experiences have an a priori integrity to them, and a skepticism that rejects all such experiences? If so, how would one formulate this "third way" while recognizing the merits of both Scheler's position and the skeptic's? How do we balance the need to meet different experiences on their own terms while still wanting a synoptic view and comparison of them?