I've been going slow through the SEP article on intrinsic properties, and came across this intriguing gem:

(The locution ‘state of affairs’ is used differently by different philosophers. Here it is being used to refer to the zero-place analogues of one-place properties and multiple place relations. Just as a property is a way of a thing is or fails to be, a state of affairs, under our usage, is a way things are or fail to be.)

I've never seen this definition before, not to my memory anyway, but it seems useful, both as an analysis of the state-of-affairs concept itself, but also on its own terms (i.e. I would be minded to accept the existence of zero-place counterpoints to properties and relations, regardless of whether I thought "states-of-affairs" was a phrase better reserved for some other conceptual phenomenon). If zeroth-order logic is usually credited with being propositional logic, however, is there a mismatching of definitions, here? For first-order logic is predicate logic, second-order logic involves predicates of other predicates (meta-predicates), or sets-of-sets (where the first-order case is sets-of-(not-sets)?). Granted, if states-of-affairs enter into the obtainment relation, and this is a truth-like or fact-like status, and truths and facts are propositional either as is or in their consequences, perhaps there is not so much of a mismatch.

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    @prof_post LOL it's all good, I've gotten a lot of good answers to questions here. I think at this point I'm just trying to trickle in some questions that can be answered either by citations or technical analysis (the latter in the case of this question) and which aren't overbearing in size like I usually post :P also I am, how shall we say, not a tenant anywhere, so I don't have a regular home base to fritter away my time at like before. Sep 26 at 1:19
  • "states of affairs" sorry, i was drunk and she was different back them lol
    – user67675
    Sep 26 at 2:14
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    It's not uncommon to think of propositions as zero-place predicates. Doing so allows us to think of propositional logic as a fragment of first order logic.
    – Bumble
    Sep 26 at 2:25
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    It does make sense intensionally. Many-place predicates need many arguments to become truth-apt and have relations as interpretations, one-place predicates need one argument to become truth-apt and have properties as interpretations, propositions need no arguments to become truth-apt and have states of affairs as interpretations. It is the extensionality of Fregean semantics that collapses them to just two constants T and F.
    – Conifold
    Sep 26 at 3:24
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    The semiotic inspiration could be the seemingly static turth-apt propositional token or a proof-theoretic type if you will is not a sign, but a sign process aka a symbol... Sep 26 at 6:18


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