Can the fact/value distinction be drawn on any conception of facts, or only some of these?

Question

The SEP article on facts goes over many conceptions of these things. Sec. 5 of the article on correspondence theories of truth lists the following objection at its end:

All facts, even the most simple ones, are disreputable. Fact-talk, being wedded to that-clauses, is entirely parasitic on truth-talk. Facts are too much like truthbearers. Facts are fictions, spurious sentence-like slices of reality, “projected from true sentences for the sake of correspondence” (Quine 1987, p. 213; cf. Strawson 1950).

Granted, if one rejects the concept of facts altogether, one will not tend to have much, if any, fact/value distinction unless it is some sort of less-objectionable truth/value distinction. But so is this phenomenon (the evaporation of the difference between such things) limited strictly to the case of a total rejection of fact-talk in the first place, or can it be wedded to variations between thin and thick theories of facts? So to say, the weaker (read: more general/abstract) a conception of facts is, the less the conception lends itself to being distinguished from (general/abstract) conceptions of values? For example, combine the disquotational picture of truth in general with "sentence-like slices of reality" talk: isn't, "I value X," is true if and only if I value X, then a fact of value? Or, "'X ought to be valued,' is true if and only if X ought to be valued," etc.: if there is no more to facts generally-speaking than such a bare truth-conditional relation, how is the fact/value distinction to be vividly drawn?

So far as I can tell, even if we differentiate, "It is valuable that ψ," from, "It is a fact that ψ," we can still go on to say, "It is a fact that it is valuable that ψ," and nothing is amiss, here, as far as ordinary language goes? Does the fact/value distinction turn on more substantive conceptions of facts and values, so that it is only drawn by those who adopt such conceptions (and can be avoided by those of us who don't read so very much, if anything, into fact-talk)?

Answer 1

So to say, the weaker (read: more general/abstract) a conception of facts is, the less the conception lends itself to being distinguished from (general/abstract) conceptions of values?

I think not, the distinction between facts and values rests more on the qualification of what constitutes values and whether values can be said to be "true" in any meaningful sense rather than the strength or weakness of one's conception of fact. The essential distinction is what "objectively is the case" and what "ought to be the case". Of course, one might consider this to be a needless and unsubstantiated dichotomy, seeing that it might be that "it is objectively the case that x ought to be the case". This exposes the ontological nature of the dispute, as those who hold a fact-value distinction are committed to the notion that values cannot be objective, and hence, by extension, reject values outright or view them as subjective in nature. So it seems to me that the case is the reverse of what you think it to be, that such a distinction is dependent on one's conception of value rather than one's conception of fact.

However one must note that this has little to do with the epistemic distinction, that one cannot determine what ought to be by what is, a contentious topic in its own right.

For example, combine the disquotational picture of truth in general with "sentence-like slices of reality" talk: isn't, "I value X," is true if and only if I value X, then a fact of value? Or, "'X ought to be valued,' is true if and only if X ought to be valued",etc. : if there is no more to facts generally-speaking than such a bare truth-conditional relation, how is the fact/value distinction to be vividly drawn?

Both examples you provided are not facts of value, they are facts of facts, i.e. qualifiers of truth. When one states ['X ought to be valued,' is true if and only if X ought to be valued], this is a statement regarding what qualifies the statement to be true, the fact is regarding what makes the statement true, not the statement itself. To elucidate, it would be perfectly coherent for one to make the following statement:

It is a fact that ['X ought to be valued,' is true if and only if X ought to be valued] though it is not a fact that [X ought to be valued].

So far as I can tell, even if we differentiate, "It is valuable that ψ," from, "It is a fact that ψ," we can still go on to say, "It is a fact that it is valuable that ψ," and nothing is amiss, here, as far as ordinary language goes?

This is correct in terms of ordinary language, in fact for one to state that "It is a fact that ψ" is perfectly coherent in ordinary language, as when one states "It is valuable that ψ" they are implicity stating it is true (see Arthur Prior for an extensive treatment of implicit truth assertions), resulting in the assertion of a fact in either case.

Does the fact/value distinction turn on more substantive conceptions of facts and values, so that it is only drawn by those who adopt such conceptions (and can be avoided by those of us who don't read so very much, if anything, into fact-talk)?

That is what seems apparent to me, the distinction seems to be dependent on one's concept of value. As for the avoidance of such a distinction by holding onto a weak form of fact or rejecting facts outright, in the former case, it seems to me that one is no better off than the one who holds on to a "strong" form of fact (whatever that may be), whilst in the latter case, I assume the distinction would no longer be.

I hope that clears things up, let me know if you have any questions or objections.

-Thanks