Let's work in a temporal logic with five tenses Pa, Pr, F, N, and Æ: "It was true that," "It is true that," "It will be true that," "It is never true that," and, "It is true at eternity that." Suppose that the three in-time operators all collapse into Pa relative to Æ, via a principle like:
I.e., if something is true at eternity, then it is true at eternity that it is true "in the past." But we could go on to:
- Æ∃xΨx → ÆPr∃xΨx
- Æ∃xΨx → ÆF∃xΨx
But we will block writing down:
I.e., we are not saying that if something happens at eternity, then it never happens. But so instead we have:
I.e., the at-eternity tense operator conforms to something akin to the knowing-that-one-knows principle in epistemic logic. This means that:
... and so on and on. Now, what we have overall with regards to representation of things intratemporally is that eternity implies sempiternity, i.e. if something exists at eternity, then it exists at all times also. So if something is known at eternity, then it is known at all times. Is this the same as being known in all times, however? For if we hold that the divine intellect is not inside of anything besides Itself (so to speak), we will want to distinguish knowledge of a time from knowledge in a time; hence we will look for a formalization of the Aquinas-Dante thesis whereby God's knowledge of future contingents (of free will, say, or quantum flux, or whatever else we countenance as partially indeterministic) is like someone looking on as a ship flows down a river, seeing the ship at all its locations without being the (direct/sufficient) cause of the ship's being at said locations.
I don't want to say that the above really clearly solves the occurrent problem. I'm not competent enough with symbolic temporal logic in particular, or symbolic logic as usual/in general (FOL), to proclaim such a thing with much confidence. However, from reading through myriads of formal systems over the years, I am rather confident that a way can be found to formalize the at-eternity tense that would clearly solve the omniscience-to-fatalism-pipeline problem (even were the solution to raise new issues, but that is the way of these things, is it not? that every answer evokes another question, whose answers evoke further questions, of the demesne of which there will be no end...). So otherwise, I would recommend reading the SEP article on temporal logic as well as Martin and Meyer[??] (see pg. 86 et seq.).