I do not believe the argument presents itself as a clear cut informal fallacy. Rather, I believe you have an objectionable premise: circularity is intolerable in language and reason. This is not how informal fallacies are defined according to Damer in his Attacking Faulty Reasoning.
The argument as presented, the interplay between the mental (opinions) and brain state (neurons) is related to the classical dispute over mental causation. If we take a close look at a simple characterization of it, it might help us refine the question. From WP:
The basic problem of mental causation is an intuitive one: on the face of it, it seems that mental events cause physical events (and vice versa), but how can mental events have any causal effect on physical events?
If I think about something, and then change my brain, and then my brain has intuitions that cause me to think differently about something else, why shouldn't I think of opinion formation as a circular process? It seems that the burden is on you to show how the argument fails. Of course, this is part of the broader literature on mental causation, and you adduce no thorough arguments or citations for or against. You do claim:
the fallacious implication is that changing of opinions is a circular process. However, this is clearly not true and is a logical jump, as we are only talking about specific opinions and specific brain processes, however we are INCLUDING all of them in the idea of this being circular.
But circularity is an unavoidable aspect of the reasoning process according to many thinkers. Consider that no definition in the dictionary relies on anything other than words. Thus, in an extended sense, all definitions, per se, are circular. Tautologies and impredicativity seem to be woven inseparably into language. All arguments carry with them presuppositions (SEP). In fact, we seem to be stuck in Neurath's boat. From WP:
We are like sailors who on the open sea must reconstruct their ship but are never able to start afresh from the bottom. Where a beam is taken away a new one must at once be put there, and for this the rest of the ship is used as support. In this way, by using the old beams and driftwood the ship can be shaped entirely anew, but only by gradual reconstruction. - Otto Neurath
Thus, you seem to have taken a position in regards to the Agrippan Trilemma without a clear cut justification of why foundationalism is superior to anti-foundationalism. Since this question about the legitimacy of circularity is an old and complex topic, presuming that the argument as presented is necessarily fallacious would seem to presume that anti-foundationalist beliefs are somehow the only legitimate first-principles in epistemology, which is clearly not a factual statement.