If something white doesn't exist, at least one of things that doesn't exist is white?
Is it logically correct?
If something white doesn't exist, at least one of things that doesn't exist is white?
Is it logically correct?
It is risky to speak about non-existent things and their properties.
Better to make use of the possibility of our language to discriminate between a concept and it referent. And to remember that some concepts do not have referents.
Transforming your sentence accordingly you say:
The whole statement from your question is a linguistic trap.
This is a statement in natural language, so its meaning is ambiguous. If you did translate it to a formal language, that process would force you to remove the ambiguities.
You would probably need a predicate logic to handle this. In the logics I'm familiar with, however, you can't meaningfully talk about the properties of a non-existent object (it's not part of your universe of discourse), so you wouldn't even be able to express this idea.
The ontologically noncommittal reading is:
The less noncommittal reading is as you have said: if there are nonexistent objects, or then if quantification and existence come apart in the end, then even if nothing that exists is white, there might be something that doesn't exist that's white, or even if something existent is white, there are also things that don't exist that happen to be white as well. At some point you will have to decide what you are going to use the word "existence" for, quantification or something more esoteric, but if you choose the latter route, your confusion is liable to proceed without bound.
Note that sentence "something white doesn't exist" is slightly ambiguous. It might mean either "There is something white that doesn't exist" or "There is nothing white that exists".
In most contexts it will probably mean "There is nothing white that exists", or just "There are no white things". And with the context people will probably be able to be sure about your meaning. But there is an ambiguity.
Mathematicians tend to explicitly quantify their propositions with "for all" or "there exists" specifically to avoid this kind of ambiguity. For instance: "There exists a white thing such that some property." or: "For all white things, some property."
Here the ambiguity is even worse because you're talking about things that don't exist, and it's unclear what is meant when we give an information about things that "don't exist". For instance, dragons and unicorns and griffins are mythological animals, so they "don't exist". But they exist in our imagination, so if I say "There are no white dragons" it's unclear whether it's just a vacuous statement (dragons don't exist, so of course white dragons don't exist either) or a statement about the colour of dragons in fiction (there are no white dragons in Harry Potter, nor in the Lord of the Rings, nor in How to train your dragon, etc.).