Can there be a clear answer to a specific philosophical question that most people who understand the question can agree on without diverging into many competing -isms or schools of thought? Maybe instead of looking for THE right answer one could look for very useful and relevant answers.
Maybe instead of looking for THE right answer one could look for very useful and relevent answers.
This was the attitude adopted by the American pragmatists. John Dewey, in Experience and Nature, called this expectation of a singular answer to philosophical questions, and the subsequent search for a grand unifying theory of everything The Philosophical Fallacy.
If one embraces this as a genuine problem, it does not mean that one should reject all the different schools and their -isms. One can simply be a pluralist and say that each speaks to some truth, and perhaps each -ism can speak to some truths that other -isms might not be able to. Dewey speaks about Romanticism in this regard and says that it says (true) things that other philosophies cannot, even though it is otherwise quite objectionable (he is actually quite harsh about it).
So, looking for useful answers does not necessarily mean rejecting -isms, but regarding them as valuable but limited.
Can there be a clear answer to a specific philosophical question that most people who understand the question can agree on without diverging into many competing -isms or schools of thought?
Yes, it appears so, assuming that one specific philosophical question will suffice.
I very recently came across Chisholm's Paradox:
It is now virtually universally acknowledged that Chisholm was right: the sort of conditional deontic claim expressed in (3) can't be faithfully represented in SDL, nor more generally by a composite of some sort of unary deontic operator and a material conditional. This is one of the few areas where there is nearly universal agreement in deontic logic. [My bold.]
Of course, it then goes on:
Whether or not this is because some special primitive dyadic deontic conditional is operating or because it is just that some non-material conditional is essential to understanding important deontic reasoning is still a hotly contested open question.