I take the In-itself and For-itself (in reading Being and Nothingness) to be entirely distinct concepts, much like a priori and a posteriori concepts.

However, with the later, I'm given to understand that we can not have entirely pure a priori or entirely pure a posteriori concepts, since any one may be an admixture of the other.

In Being and Nothingness Sartre doesn't mention pure in-itselfs or pure for-itselfs. However, it seems that he uses each term concretely, which causes me to think that they could be "pure" concepts. Are they?

  • As you already claimed that In Being and Nothingness Sartre doesn't mention pure for-itselfs, can you reference where Kant mentioned 'pure a posteriori concepts' (don't be confused with Kant's pure concept of sensibility though)? Overall your linking of K & S theses here could be said to be worthwhile and useful... Jan 29 at 4:30
  • @DoubleKnot There are certainly no pure a posteriori concepts in Kant.
    – user71009
    Jan 29 at 6:58
  • 1
    @abcga I certainly wish the poster could reference his concept of 'pure a posteriori concepts' in Kant, note the other one is a totally different situation... Jan 29 at 7:34
  • No sooner had I made this post, I did indeed stumble upon a passage in Being and Nothingness where Sartre makes mention of pure For-itselfs. I'm afraid I cannot reference the concept of 'pure a posteriori' concepts in Kant. It being given that there is mention of 'pure a priori' concepts, I simply took the former as given. Jan 30 at 5:07


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