When I pick up an object, I feel its heaviness. Classical mechanics tells us that what determines how heavy something feels to a given person is a property of matter called mass. I see a kind of similiarity between this case and the case about color (i.e. how a given person perceives a certain color has to do with wavelength of light). So, after all, is the feeling of how heavy something is usually considered to be a quale?
From the SEP
Feelings and experiences vary widely. For example, I run my fingers over sandpaper, smell a skunk, feel a sharp pain in my finger, seem to see bright purple, become extremely angry. In each of these cases, I am the subject of a mental state with a very distinctive subjective character. There is something it is like for me to undergo each state, some phenomenology that it has. Philosophers often use the term ‘qualia’ (singular ‘quale’) to refer to the introspectively accessible, phenomenal aspects of our mental lives. In this broad sense of the term, it is difficult to deny that there are qualia.
Heaviness is a feeling - it feels heavy; it has a subjective character - I feel that this suitcase is heavy; it is phenomenal - until I pick up that suitcase it won't feel heavy. Being angry, for example, isn't phenomenal - I can't hear, or see or smell something that makes me angry; this isn't to say that listening to someone libel me won't make me angry, but here it isn't the phenomenal experience of sound that is causing the anger, but what is being said.
So heaviness is an example of qualia - but not a common one. Heaviness is on the perceptual side of perception-physical divide, its corresponding physical cause is pressure.
More commonly, examples are drawn from colour, say redness, whose physical cause is a certain wavelength of light.