In the discussion leading up to BXVI Kant consideres the application of reason to empirical cognition as in physical experiments, or to theoretical cognition as in mathematics. In these cases the term "object" is distinct from the faculty of reason itself. That is, we are thinking about the object, a ball rolling down an inclined plane, or we are thinking about the object, an idealized triangle, etc. But when we attempt to examine reason itself, reason becomes both the topic of inquiry as well as the means of inquiry.

Thus one might say that we are objectifying the elements of reason. This is were my uncertainty comes in. For example, in the footnote to BXVIII & BXIX what is meant by objects in the highlighted sentence?

This method, accordingly, which we have borrowed from the natural philosopher, consists in seeking for the elements of pure reason in that which admits of confirmation or refutation by experiment. Now the propositions of pure reason, especially when they transcend the limits of possible experience, do not admit of our making any experiment with their objects, as in natural science. Hence, with regard to those conceptions and principles which we assume à priori, our only course will be to view them from two different sides. We must regard one and the same conception, on the one hand, in relation to experience as an object of the senses and of the understanding, on the other hand, in relation to reason, isolated and transcending the limits of experience, as an object of mere thought. Now if we find that, when we regard things from this double point of view, the result is in harmony with the principle of pure reason, but that, when we regard them from a single point of view, reason is involved in self-contradiction, then the experiment will establish the correctness of this distinction.



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