My intuitive reaction to thought experiments such as described in the following question leaves me thinking I am not my body.
Almost Sure Mind Transfer via Parfit's Identity Theory (interesting thought experiment)
Here is a formalized argument representing my intuition. The two highlighted premises are argued in the answers below.
Premise 1) If the I is caused by the body, it is either caused by the body's matter and/or structure.
Premise 2) Given any two Is in a consciousness body's timeline, they are the same I.
Premise 3) If and only if two effects are the same, then the two causes must be the same.
Premise 4) Given two particular points in a body's timeline, the body's matter is completely different.
Conclusion 1) By premises 2-4 neither the body's matter, nor the matter/structure combination, can be the cause of the I.
Premise 5) It is possible to replicate the body's structure exactly. Yet the replica, despite having exactly the same structure, will have a different I.
Conclusion 2) By premises 2, 3 and 5 the body's dynamic structure cannot be the cause of the I.
Conclusion 3) By premise 1 and conclusions 1 and 2, the I is not caused by the body. In other words, I am not my body.
Is this argument deductively valid? Are any of the premises false? If none are false, is the argument sound?
If you disagree with premise 5, consider the alternative. For example, if someone could replicate your brain structure exactly on silicon, would you agree to be killed in the hopes you would be revived as an artificial intelligence? Or, say you were killed and your brain structure was instantiated twice in silicon. Which one will you be revived as?
Here are some related questions:
What is the modern solution to the mind-body problem for those who still hold the mind is separate?
If I upload my brain into a computer is it still me?
Would rebuilding a human body rebuild the person it was?
What's the difference between cloning and metabolism in terms of affecting personal identity?