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In The logic of scientific discovery, Karl Popper makes the following statement:

The empirical basis of objective science has thus nothing ‘absolute’ about it. Science does not rest upon solid bedrock. The bold structure of its theories rises, as it were, above a swamp. It is like a building erected on piles. The piles are driven down from above into the swamp, but not down to any natural or ‘given’ base; and if we stop driving the piles deeper, it is not because we have reached firm ground. We simply stop when we are satisfied that the piles are firm enough to carry the structure, at least for the time being. (5 The Problem of the Empirical Basis, 30 Theory and Experiment)

Scientific realism is defined as follows:

Scientific realism is a positive epistemic attitude toward the content of our best theories and models, recommending belief in both observable and unobservable aspects of the world described by the sciences. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/scientific-realism/#Empi

Therefore, can we still consider Popper as a scientific realist?

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    Not really, but he would disagree, see SEP:"Popper claims to be a realist and rejects conventionalist and instrumentalist accounts of science. But his account in the Logic of Scientific Discovery of the role played by basic statements in the methodology of falsification seems to sit uneasily with that... There can be little doubt but that it constitutes a form of conventionalism in its own right. And it is not clear that it is compatible with scientific realism." He did try to look like a realist with the three-worlds ontology.
    – Conifold
    Commented May 18 at 12:29
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    Carnap was definitely not a realist, and not an anti-realist either, he was 'a plague on both your houses':"The statement asserting the reality of the external world (realism) as well as its negation in various forms, e.g. solipsism and several forms of idealism, in the traditional controversy are pseudo-statements, i.e., devoid of cognitive content", SEP. I do not know about "absolute", but commitment to something like "science describes reality as it objectively is in broad strokes" is fair to expect from a realist.
    – Conifold
    Commented May 18 at 13:39
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    @Conifold Carnap was an instrumentalist, which is an anti-realist position... "In the first half of the twentieth century, however, empiricism came predominantly in the form of varieties of “instrumentalism”: the view that theories are merely instruments for predicting observable phenomena or systematizing observation reports."
    – Starckman
    Commented May 18 at 13:42
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    "According to the best known, traditional form of instrumentalism, terms for unobservables have no meaning all by themselves; construed literally, statements involving them are not even candidates for truth or falsity (cf. a more recent proposal in Rowbottom 2011). The most influential advocates of this view were the logical empiricists (or logical positivists), including Carnap and Hempel, famously associated with the Vienna Circle group of philosophers and scientists as well as important contributors elsewhere." plato.stanford.edu/entries/scientific-realism/#QualVari
    – Starckman
    Commented May 18 at 13:42
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    Correct, the PhilPapers 2020 poll. But it is not a poll of "contemporary philosophers", but of predominantly analytic philosophers from academic departments in Anglophone countries. Still, realism is on the rise among continental philosophers in other countries too in the last 20 years, see speculative realism. Whether it is settled or just a fad remains to be seen, and post-modernism is still around.
    – Conifold
    Commented May 18 at 14:04

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