While Heidegger's Dasein seeks to redefine the human subject in terms of being-in-the-world, does he fully break away from Husserl's subjectivity and lebenswelt?

In his detailed study Not Saved, Peter Sloterdijk offers a poignant critique of Heidegger, suggesting that Heidegger's retreat into a philosophy of rootedness and origin (Ursprunglichkeit) is a form of escapism from the cosmopolitan reality of human expansion. Sloterdijk challenges Heidegger's notion of Dasein by proposing an anthropotechnics approach, where humans are understood as beings in constant kinetic movement, shaping and reshaping themselves and their world. This view implies a more dynamic and self-determining human condition, constrasting with Heidegger's static Dasein.

Sloterdijk's critique extends to Heidegger's later works where he perceives a parochial return to a Catholic-Augustinian view of humanity as inherently flawed and incapable of overcoming this flaw without metaphysical or spiritual intercession. Sloterdijk contends that this represents a perversion of the human potential for self-transcendence and growth, thus limiting the freedom and creative power that he takes to be intrinsic to human nature.

Are we to gather from this that there is a deep ontological determinism or lack of freedom in Heidegger's conception of Dasein?

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    This critique is not new, Feenberg ascribes determinism to late Heidegger in Questioning Technology based on similar arguments, for a critique of them see Casil. The truth is that Heidegger, like Kant, hoped to remove metaphysical presuppositions that lead to the determinism/free will dilemma, and, unlike Kant, did not even consider it directly. Kant's 'dissolution' is viewed as deeply unsatisfactory today. Dicerson compares it to Heidegger's and argues that his is unsatisfactory too.
    – Conifold
    Commented May 21 at 7:30


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