While Heidegger's Dasein seeks to redefine the human subject in terms of being-in-the-world, does he fully break away from Husserl's subjectivity and lebenswelt?
In his detailed study Not Saved, Peter Sloterdijk offers a poignant critique of Heidegger, suggesting that Heidegger's retreat into a philosophy of rootedness and origin (Ursprunglichkeit) is a form of escapism from the cosmopolitan reality of human expansion. Sloterdijk challenges Heidegger's notion of Dasein by proposing an anthropotechnics approach, where humans are understood as beings in constant kinetic movement, shaping and reshaping themselves and their world. This view implies a more dynamic and self-determining human condition, constrasting with Heidegger's static Dasein.
Sloterdijk's critique extends to Heidegger's later works where he perceives a parochial return to a Catholic-Augustinian view of humanity as inherently flawed and incapable of overcoming this flaw without metaphysical or spiritual intercession. Sloterdijk contends that this represents a perversion of the human potential for self-transcendence and growth, thus limiting the freedom and creative power that he takes to be intrinsic to human nature.
Are we to gather from this that there is a deep ontological determinism or lack of freedom in Heidegger's conception of Dasein?