Consider the part of the following text (from Kant) that I've emphasized in bold:
The conception of a dog indicates a rule, according to which my imagination can delineate the figure of a four-footed animal in general, without being limited to any particular individual form which experience presents to me, or indeed to any possible image that I can represent to myself in concreto. This schematism of our understanding in regard to phenomena and their mere form, is an art, hidden in the depths of the human soul, whose true modes of action we shall only with difficulty discover and unveil. Thus much only can we say:—The image is a product of the empirical faculty of the productive imagination—the schema of sensuous conceptions (of figures in space, for example) is a product, and, as it were, a monogram of the pure imagination à priori, whereby and according to which images first become possible, which, however, can be connected with the conception only mediately by means of the schema which they indicate, and are in themselves never fully adequate to it.
So, a bunch of people, including me for example, think that reading words made by those things, is like trying to read in a dream. And very precisely: I asked Gemini (Google's construct) to make an image of a moth made of words, and it did, but the words were less than gibberish; they were like asemic writing, even. Then I asked it to make a calligram of the word "hope" in the shape of a butterfly, and it didn't, although it claimed that it "Certainly" had (and produced a very poor ASCII graphic that it step-by-step explained as a butterfly image, despite the explanation not making any sense).
But so I also asked it to read the following picture:
Maybe I shouldn't have been amazed, but I was, because Gemini was able to put all the words together perfectly. Yet on the other hand, I then asked it to read the following:
And Gemini just got hung up on it, not offering even an attempt at reading it. Could the waviness of the words have really been the difference-maker? Yet the second picture has more of that "trying to read words in a dream" feel to it, which I would have thought would have resonated more with the AI.I Like, it would have "subconsciously" corrected for the distorted angling of the letters; but that's not what it actually did.
With these LLMs and stuff, has humanity somehow figured out the "art" of the productive imagination that Kant spoke about?
INot "artificial intelligence," here, but "artificial imagination." But now didn't this thing about these image generators have something to do with "dream recording" experiments? Like, you'd train the "recorder" to read certain brain signals as words, then match the words to images from Google Images (or wherever), etc. But to streamline this better, they needed a way to handle the transitions between images more organically, and even the well-formed (normal number of fingers, etc.) AI images have this weird "fuzziness" to their edges that is a total tell; again, though, as if AI imagery is a technological realization of the brain modules/pathways that conduct our dreams (and hence the productive imagination). (I haven't been able to double-check that memory yet; but it seems like I remember this issue from back in like 2021 or 2022, around the time they said something about Google's AI making its own language and speaking to other AIs in this language.)
Clarification: I guess my question can be phrased as, "Is the way that these LLMs/image-generators/etc. programmed or coded (although I've heard there's some sort of non-coding involved???) an example of the process of schematism?" Because when an image generator makes nine versions of a response to a prompt, is that a matter of starting from the prompt-as-a-schematic and cashing it out in the way of the productive imagination, but then perforce variously (these things could make a hundred versions of a prompt-response, after all...)?
Or, with a different meaning though: "When Kant says that there is a discovery that would be made with difficulty, and that 'thus much we can say' for now, is he saying that he has made this discovery, after his difficult reflections upon transcendental ideality, or is he saying that this discovery awaits a later age with a new spirit of understanding regarding these matters?" And so if the latter: is this the time of that understanding, via these AI/like "entities"?