You ask:
Does physical reality exist without an observer?
Well, for science, you'll get the answer yes. But as we are a philosophical forum, the answer might be more complicated like, it depends on whose metaphysical presuppositions you favor. That is, despite science being a dominant way of thinking about the world (it certainly is my way), it is not the only way. George Berkeley, for instance, would claim no. Let's explore.
It is a central tenet of modern physicalism (SEP) that physical and external reality exists prior to consciousness. That is to say, minds and their observations of the world, supervene upon the physical world, and the world is mind-independent. Perhaps the broadest, contemporary school of thought on this is scientific realism (SEP). From the SEP:
Metaphysically, realism is committed to the mind-independent existence of the world investigated by the sciences. This idea is best clarified in contrast with positions that deny it. For instance, it is denied by any position that falls under the traditional heading of “idealism”, including some forms of phenomenology, according to which there is no world external to and thus independent of the mind. This sort of idealism, however, though historically important, is rarely encountered in contemporary philosophy of science. More common rejections of mind-independence stem from neo-Kantian views of the nature of scientific knowledge, which deny that the world of our experience is mind-independent, even if (in some cases) these positions accept that the world in itself does not depend on the existence of minds.
Of course, idealism (SEP) is the classic rejection of the mind-independence of the world. Idealism was the dominant view before the 20th century. From the SEP:
This entry discusses philosophical idealism as a movement chiefly in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, although anticipated by certain aspects of seventeenth century philosophy and continuing into the twentieth century. It revises the standard distinction between epistemological idealism, the view that the contents of human knowledge are ineluctably determined by the structure of human thought, and ontological idealism, the view that epistemological idealism delivers truth because reality itself is a form of thought and human thought participates in it... between epistemological and metaphysical arguments for idealism as itself a metaphysical position.
So, when a physicist gives you their perspective, you should expect them to reject idealism. The mind-independence of the world is part of the modern scientific worldview. If you are looking for good counterarguments, therefore, you need to look past the chorus of scientists and find philosophers who have different presuppositions. One good starting place is the work of George Berkeley (SEP):
But what exactly is a material thing? Interestingly, part of Berkeley’s attack on matter is to argue that this question cannot be satisfactorily answered by the materialists, that they cannot characterize their supposed material things. However, an answer that captures what exactly it is that Berkeley rejects is that material things are mind-independent things or substances. And a mind-independent thing is something whose existence is not dependent on thinking/perceiving things, and thus would exist whether or not any thinking things (minds) existed. Berkeley holds that there are no such mind-independent things, that, in the famous phrase, esse est percipi (aut percipere) — to be is to be perceived (or to perceive).
So, is physical reality mind-independent? Science presumes it and to answer 'no' would be considered non-scientific. But there are other worldviews other than science and scientism, so some may certainly reply 'no'. You'll have to continue reading to decide for yourself.