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I'm having some trouble understanding exactly what position a non-realist takes when they present a normative ethical theory.

Definition: Normative ethics is the study of ethical behaviour and is the branch of philosophical ethics that investigates questions regarding how one ought to act, in a moral sense.

I understand that a normative position can be separate from a metaethical one, yet I am still experiencing some confusion.

The non-realist says, "what is morally good is what has the best outcome", but they don't actually believe that, because for example they think morality doesn't exist, or it isn't truth apt.

I would fully understand, if instead of saying "morally good" they said "good", then it seems to me any end is valid since "good" isn't specific, but 'Morality' is baked into the definition of normative ethics, to say the aim of an ethical theory is that everyone ought to fulfil my preference seems invalid, it is not a moral reason, and the hypothetical non-realist doesn't think any moral reason could be valid anyway.

So the non realist is not saying how one ought to act in a moral sense, they are just saying how one ought to act, therefore this doesn't meet the definition of normative ethics.

So my question is, if normative ethics requires a moral reason, how can a non-realist participate here?

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    Wikipedia's insertion of morality into normative ethics generally is not exactly the consensus. But non-realists can easily talk even about normative morality. All they have to do is distinguish different kinds of oughts and designate a subclass of them as moral, as opposed to prudential, epistemic, pragmatic, etc. There is no need for objective morality to exist and be truth-apt to allow talk about such moral oughts. What strongly affects the well-being of other people can be designated as "moral", for example, and the corresponding oughts can be grounded in emotions, social instincts, etc.
    – Conifold
    Commented Jul 19 at 23:39
  • @Conifold, I cannot find a definition of normative ethics that is divorced from morality, nor can I understand how that would work. Ethics is generally a synonym for morality, and normative ethics is a branch of moral philosophy, could you expand on what you mean?
    – Aph002
    Commented Jul 20 at 4:44
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    "Ethics" in the narrow sense (admittedly, most common) is identified with morality, but in the broad sense it covers how to act generally, not necessarily based on moral grounds (which typically leave it wide open). Much of virtue ethics deals with personal prosperity of some sort, for example, rather distinct from conventional moralizing rooted in religious traditions, secularized or not. One can, of course, still choose to call hedonistic, prudential or epistemic norms "moral", but they are quite distinct from the ten commandments, 'natural' human rights, and their progeny.
    – Conifold
    Commented Jul 20 at 6:40

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I liken it to optimization and/or decision theory. You first have to pick the objective function you want to optimize. The diversity of morals can be thought to be due to differences in people's objective functions for moral behavior.

In addition, some people (non-realists) will acknowledge that there is no metaphysically correct objective function, merely different proposals for ends and means. Our received morality comes out of this interplay between means, ends, and justification (either metaphysical or epistemological).

So, a non-realist would be able to participate by saying "I think we should avoid unnecessary human suffering" -- those that agree can then participate in that moral discussion. Those who disagree can provide reasons and if they are not convincing, we have a moral impasse (moral pluralism) that may get violent.

This is really no different than how we make any other decision, especially as a group. Imagine, say, a group of friends picking a restaurant for lunch:

  • Friend A: Let's go to McDonalds, I'm really in the mood for fries and I am hungry (goal: maximize satiation)
  • Friend B: I'd prefer Salata -- I'm trying to eat healthier and reduce my meat consumption (goal: maximize healthiness and minimize harm to animals)

Here we have differing views of what constitutes a "good" restaurant pick. How will this play out?

  1. They can both refuse to change their preference (impasse) and will go their separate ways.
  2. They converge to one or the other (persuasion - other person's objective function changes to explicitly include the value of the friendship)
  3. They pick a different place altogether (compromise/win-win - both update objective functions to take into account the friendship)

So the process of moral discourse can be seen as an attempt to align individual objective functions. There is no guarantee it always happens, and so we inevitably will have conflict and ethical pluralism.

So the moral non-realist can still participate just as fully as a realist, its just that a non-realist would state it in terms of preferences and persuasion vs objective truth and admonition.

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  • Perhaps the question I should have asked is what is meant by "-in a moral sense" in the definition of Normative Ethics. If Normative Ethics needs at its foundation a moral claim, then how can a non-realist participate? I can see that a non-realist can make normative ought claims in order to forward their non-moral aims, but they cannot honestly make moral claims, and so I am struggling to connect that with the definition of Normative Ethics.
    – Aph002
    Commented Jul 18 at 23:48
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    @Aph002 I guess if you define morals as having to exist in and of themselves then non-realist morality doesn’t exist by definition so I think there’s a broader definition of morality that allows people to be non-realist and it’s what I gave above
    – Annika
    Commented Jul 19 at 0:28
  • Thank you, I think I can understand that when applied to Emotivism, our morality is what we think works in favour of our objective function. Which we can systematize into a normative ethical theory, am I correct? However, I am less clear on how this could work within error-theory, no matter how broad the definition, the moral claims of an error theorist cannot be anything but false, and surely a normative ethical theory cannot be built on claims that cannot be anything but false.
    – Aph002
    Commented Jul 19 at 1:08
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    @Aph002 agreed — so one must find a basis where it is sensible or declare it invalid
    – Annika
    Commented Jul 19 at 1:36

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