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Analytic philosophy tends to not be concerned with meta questions and resolves a distinction between analytic truths and synthetic truths, favouring an analysis on the analytic aspect, usually in relation to meaning and linguistics.

Yet, there are still two fundamental questions need to be resolved: a) How can analytic truths be established as truths non-circularly, in a warranted way? b) How can the concrete, finite thinker establish its own reasoning as accessing/producing such truths? Especially in the context of the usual naturalism and secularism of analytic philosophy that has an anthropic conception of man as a finite, evolved creature through blind processes not teleologically oriented towards analytical truths, and without a trascendental access to a universal realm of truths?

I find that this issue is fundamental and should be basic for any serious analytic philosophy. It is the first step for any critical self-conception. Any serious meta approach needs to be able to ground itself, and yet I find little exploration of this, and of some of this, don't resolve this as a meta-question(which that's what it is), trying to establish it linguistically, or pragmatically, appealing to coherentist solutions and so on. All quite unsatisfactory and that don't resolve. The greatest attempt I know, indirectly, is Sellar's "Myth of the Given". It seems that any promisory answer seems to be largely to go against these theses, implying a nobler view of man and its faculties and its nature. Am I missing something?

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    I am not quite sure why the question focuses on analytic truths. Those are just glorified conventions that concrete, finite thinkers can establish without access to "universal realm of truths", whatever that might be. If we agree to call unmarried man "bachelor" then "bachelor is an unmarried man" will be an analytic truth. It can get more intricate, in mathematics especially, or vaguer, with shifty linguistic conventions, but the base idea of conceptual analysis is just untangling conventions. A more interesting question would be how to ground our epistemic access to synthetic truths.
    – Conifold
    Commented Jul 19 at 23:51
  • Not all would agree they are glorified conventions. But in any case, because they are foundational for the logical analysis. The logical principles, which are analytical and 'a priori' are said to be able to produce truths. You may say that these are just untangling conventions, but even then one would appeal to the truth of the untangled convention such that "X is Y", in a universal sense, so we can say things like 2+2=4 and there are no married bachelors.
    – Sismetic
    Commented Jul 21 at 1:45
  • "Words and things" by Gellner
    – alanf
    Commented Jul 23 at 10:45

3 Answers 3

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You seem to be using 'analytic philosophy' in a rather old-fashioned sense. Russell at one time followed a simple dualistic approach to knowledge under which science is responsible for determining the truths of synthetic propositions and philosophy is concerned with conceptual analysis. I don't think this has been popular for a long time. One of the reasons many philosophers prefer the term 'analytical philosophy' is precisely to get away from the association with 'analytic' propositions. Many philosophers in the analytical tradition don't even believe there are such things as analytic propositions.

As to foundations and grounding, if you mean foundational truths, why would you suppose there are such things? Foundationalism in epistemology has an abysmal track record. We are adrift in Neurath's boat, doing the best we can to move in the direction of more and better knowledge through a process of critical enquiry. We make progress by acquiring new information and by criticising the beliefs and theories we have. What we don't have is an epistemological edifice that rises up from an incontrovertible and indubitable base.

The kind of grounding we do have is a methodological one, and even that is subject to criticism and revision.

I wrote more about the nature of analytical philosophy in my answer to this question.

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  • I understand the analytic part in analytic philosophy as the logical analysis, usually done with formal logic. That is, a close relation to mathematics and logic, and then a separation of the empirical investigations(natural sciences) as a different role than that of philosophy. It seems I have been ignorant here thinking analytic philosophy is as it was on the early. Yet, I'm confused. All self-proclaimed analytic philosophers I've met aim at a linguistic and logical analysis, and favour a naturalist and scientific view of reality that must inform philosophy.
    – Sismetic
    Commented Jul 21 at 1:48
  • As for supposing a foundation for things, isn't that a basic rational and epistemic intuition, the object of epistemology? The distinction between a mere claim and knowledge would be that one is grounded in some way. Yet, the problem of grounding the grounding is present. You say there is a methodological grounding, but even that phrase, how can we ascertain its truth? That is, you are making an epistemic claim. I must ask how do you ground the truth of the claim? You will try to justify in some sense, and so the problem ensues. I am also left wondering what grounds the methodology?
    – Sismetic
    Commented Jul 21 at 1:51
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    Thank you for the answer, btw. I read your answer on the question you pointed to. Yes, my understanding of analytic philosophy seems to be the old one, but it's also one I'm seeing even in current, credible sources like the SEP, and with contemporary everyday philosophers. As for the difference between analytic vs analytical, I find it odd. Isn't all of this awfully UNclear? I am not sure analytical philosophers(or analytic) are all that clear, but they use first-order logic, I think.
    – Sismetic
    Commented Jul 21 at 1:55
  • But then a question remains for me: if what constitutes the current and broad analytical philosophy is the use of formal logic(I think you said logic, but I take that to mean formal logic, or first-order logic) and a form of scientism(favouring a primacy of science), how does this push forward beyond the analytic vs synthetic distinction? Or 'a priori and posteriori'? Say, the issue with Hegel is not that he's not being logical, and I doubt he would be accepted if someone translated his views to formal logic, which is trivial.
    – Sismetic
    Commented Jul 21 at 1:58
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    Hegel would seemingly not be accepted by the analytical tradition because he would be seen as having a flight of fancy, which seems to be tied to the notion of his system not being derived as a product(even if there's nothign contradictory) or subordinate to science but rather would seem to subordinate science to it. This non-empirical pure rationalism seems to validate that there's a distinction being made, and that it is the philosopher's job to do an analysis compatible with the empirical. Or what am I missing here?
    – Sismetic
    Commented Jul 21 at 2:00
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I think there's a short answer. There are four large interelated components to analytic philosophy that go a long way to answering you question, and may in fact be sufficient.

First is that analytic philosophy (AP) rejects historicism. That is. AP rejects that requirement that the historical development is necessary for understanding anything.

Second is the rejection of holism and acceptance of common sense understanding. That is, when we see a table or chair, we understand it without having to understand it's role in existence of everything.

Third is the reality of external relations. This means we can understand the essence of things soley by analzing that thing alone. Everything is separate in this regard, allowing immediate and isolated understanding and existence.

Fourth is the objective reality of concepts. For example, mathematics is timeless and certain because concepts are objective and timeless.

I think it's clear with these related ideas, it is relatively easy to secure/ground knowledge and AP's metaphysics. We understand the nature of the chair or any concept because isolated, direct study is possible and suffices.

I'm basically repeating some of Cahoone's lecture on AP which I've linked throughout. It’s the most satisfying and understandable treatment of AP I’ve come across.

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  • I upvoted because this absolutely a great description of analytic philosophy up to Quine. I would suggest however, that analytic philosophy entered a post-positivist phase with Quine, Kuhn, Sellars, Kripke, Chomsky and others and has swung back in the opposite direction of undermining all four of these principles.
    – J D
    Commented Jul 21 at 17:20
  • @JD yes you are right. OP should not accept my answer because like you said (and demonstrate in your answer) there are modern challenges.
    – J Kusin
    Commented Jul 21 at 17:28
  • I'm not sure that your answer isn't the best for the question as phrased. The OP seems to suggest that they view analytic philosophy through a particular lens. Bumble and I certainly challenge the premise of the question, but the OP needn't accept the undermining of the premise. As such, you might actually have the best answer! ; )
    – J D
    Commented Jul 21 at 17:52
  • Thanks. I'm unsure how these are justified and how they justify but will look at the resources before getting back. Thank you!
    – Sismetic
    Commented Jul 21 at 22:30
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You say:

Analytic philosophy tends to not be concerned with meta questions and resolves a distinction between analytic truths and synthetic truths, favouring an analysis on the analytic aspect, usually in relation to meaning and linguistics.

I'm not sure that there's much value outside of historical analysis of observing the analytic-synthetic distinction in language, the typical philosopher's preoccupation with Kant aside. In a naturalized epistemology, the dominance of psychologism as a means of framing one's metaphysical principles and the authority of linguistics takes front seat in analytic philosophy. The analytic-synthetic distinction has been noted as problematic since the 1940's (SEP). From the article The Analytic/Synthetic Distinct:

if the claim Brothers are male siblings should be synonymous with Brothers are brothers, and thinking the one should be no different from thinking the other. But, aside from such simple cases as brother and bachelor, proposed analyses, if successful, often seemed quite non-obvious and philosophically informative... This is “the paradox of analysis,” which can be seen as dormant in Frege’s own move from his (1884) focus on definitions to his more controversial (1892a) doctrine of “sense,” where two senses are distinct if and only if someone can think a thought containing the one but not other, as in the case of the senses of “the morning star” and “the evening star.”

This paradox of analysis was resolved by Quine in the Two Dogmas satisfactorily through the introduction of the term "cognitive synonymy". In modern linguistics, the rule of thumb is ANY distinction in syntax represents some difference in semantics, and Quine's cognitive synonymy anticipated work in linguistics where every unique context is an instance of monosemanticity. This accords nicely with a traditional application of the Identity of Indiscernibles since intension can be seen not just a one or more propositions, but holophrastic continuum. Linguistic holophrasis, for instance, is the use of a single word that conveys a potentially contextually complex meaning. Words are a shallow medium to describe thought, and they introduce ambiguities. Thus, science, on this reading, also supports Quine's inscrutability of reference.

You ask some questions:

Yet, there are still two fundamental questions need to be resolved: a) How can analytic truths be established as truths non-circularly, in a warranted way? b) How can the concrete, finite thinker establish its own reasoning as accessing/producing such truths? Especially in the context of the usual naturalism and secularism of analytic philosophy that has an anthropic conception of man as a finite, evolved creature through blind processes not teleologically oriented towards analytical truths, and without a transcendental access to a universal realm of truths?

The short answer is that because propositions can be logically consistent but somewhat meaningless, truth-conditional semantics is not sufficient to warrant anything more than the coherence of the logical structure of claims. In other words, the theory of coherent truth is insufficient for adequate warrant because it doesn't ensure that true statements are meaningful. This would seem to imply that logicism itself as a solution to all of meaning and metaphysical grounding is insufficient. This of course would come as no surprise to those who read the mathematical philosophy of C.S. Pierce or L.E.J. Brouwer who rely on an interpretation of meaning, at least in mathematics, that is empirical or intuitional in nature.

Another different response to this problem, and one response that comes from the meta-semantic disputes of the Linguistic Wars, is an alternative class of semantics known as cognitive semantics. For instance instance, while logic constants may permeate discourse, the semantics of morphemes and lexemes are not logical at all, but are rooted in context and experience. This sort of theorizing is handy at clearing up most of the mysteries of exophoric reference. From the WP article:

The main tenets of cognitive semantics are:

That grammar manifests a conception of the world held in a culture;
That knowledge of language is acquired and contextual;
That the ability to use language draws upon general cognitive resources and not a special language module.

One last strategy for metaphysical grounding is the notion that cognition itself is embodied. Instead of seeing semantics as grounded in logical systems, it is possible instead to believe that meaning is derived from bodily experience (something that hardly would have displeased the Classical Empiricists, no?). This is the notion of embodied cognition (SEP).

Dummett held that the origins of analytic philosophy and the Linguistic Turn rested with Frege, and clearly the logicist agenda has been and continues to be influential in thinkers, particularly those swayed by his Platonic, anti-psychological thinking about language and meaning. But since the 1950's, analytic philosophy has taken an increasingly empirical approach to answering questions with Quine clearly being a bellwether for rejecting the idea that words are bearers of meaning, and philosophy operating distinctly from science. It is in this more contemporary attitude towards analyticity, one that rejects the analytic-synthetic divide entirely, that much modern analytic philosophy is conducted.

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  • In the spirit of keeping my personal opinions somewhat distinct from my editorial perspective, the analytic-synthetic divide is as about as useful as the theory of humors. Any philosopher clinging to it for contemporary (and obviously not historical) explication, missed the lesson drawn from the failure of the logical atomists and logical empiricists/positivists.
    – J D
    Commented Jul 21 at 16:57
  • Thank you. You seem quite erudite on this. I stand corrected on the analytic/synthetic distinction, but I have some questions. I think such aspect is largely secondary to my point. My larger point is basically how can we use logic, and how does logic validate or not(its epistemic relation). It seems to me that this is not entirely done away. Quine was reasoning, and hence using reason as an epistemic tool that used the logical structures of reason to validate/invalidate, right? To say it is insufficient doesn't seem invalidate it. It seems to be required but insufficient
    – Sismetic
    Commented Jul 22 at 2:00
  • Which still seems to import largely the epistemic value of logic and reasoning. I am also unsure how the relation to b), that is, to how stable truths are accessible to the subject is resolved. It seems to me that Quine, as a pragmatist, left the problem open. I also have a question regarding the distinction. Is it not the case that I know tigers are carnivore through a synthetic process, while I can know 1+1 != 3 through an analytic process? I understand some objections, but is the distinction invalidated?
    – Sismetic
    Commented Jul 22 at 2:05
  • We can, after all, distinguish the mathematic and the logician from the mechanic or the biologist. I understand Quine to be saying that the analytic aspect is not entirely analytic(which seems to me problematic but let's ignore that), and so empiricize the analytic, which falls in line with his pragmatism, and yet, there seems to still be a valid distinction between, say, truths I can know from my chair and truths that I must get out of the chair, and a philosopher would not need to get out of the chair to do its proper work while, say, a neuroscientist would.
    – Sismetic
    Commented Jul 22 at 2:06
  • That's a bit of what I was saying(is that still invalidated?) by the distinction, that analytic philosophy says the scientist must inform the philosopher, who must be mainly a logician and linguist. And yet, the scientist need not be a logician and linguist. Even if there's a favouring of the empirical sciences(this is notable in neuroscience) over logical statements, is there still not a methodological distinction and priority in philosophy for logic and reasoning, including its formality, categoriality, and hence universality(all form is tautologically universal)? Hope this is not too ignor
    – Sismetic
    Commented Jul 22 at 2:12

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