Despite some surface appearances, A Theory of Justice is not very "ahistorical" almost at all. So Rawls mentions the issue of intolerant extremists, esp. religious ones, with an eye towards his audience recognizing such American precedents as there had been by then (1971 originally).
Accordingly, it is only part of the picture, the question as to how e.g. Rawlsian pluralism can apply stateside in a certain religiously-charged case, but besides the historical matter of how the religious angles in play both diverge and converge variously? For in the case of the RCC, say, it is a relatively straightforward attempt at metaphysical understanding, to talk about the dividing line between ensouled and soulless objects, etc. However, I have also read that part of the distinctively American Christian basis for strong abortion/contraception regulations hearkens to racial paranoia, such as "olden-days" versions of the white-replacement notion. Mind you, Rawls would not have been much more minded to engage with Catholic pro-life arguments than with arguments implicitly designed by the KKK and similar groups: but he still would have engaged more with them to some extent nevertheless (or else he would not have so sporadically, but noticeably, sprinkled A Theory of Justice with Catholic references, some of which are at least neutral or even, maybe, positive...).
Now, another point that should be made, then, is that on the metaphilosophical level as well, Rawlsian pluralism should be accommodating, somehow, for the sake of analysts like Plantinga and van Inwagen (maybe not Craig, to be fair: forgive me, but I really just can't accept someone promoting a version of an ideology that requires them to vividly rationalize mass atrocities, even if the slaughters were in an ancient, possibly-mythical past). (Supposedly, Plantinga made some dubious remarks about the sincerity of the witch-hunters of yore, but I've yet to confirm that claim.) So, it's not like we ourselves could tolerate only Catholic inputs into the intended "overlapping consensus" debate.
However, and here's the rub for Plantinga, or Reformed epistemology as a whole: by having things like the "Aquinas-Calvin model" of our "sense of deity/having been created," with the purported epistemic superiority this yields, their theories become diametrically opposed to the conditions of non-aggressive resolution of non-aggression problems. Cornelius van Til saw it clearly: the principle of the transcendental argument for the existence of God (that nothing can be proven unless we assume it was created by God to be provable, so that God is the precondition of all possible proof whatsoever) is totalitarian, which is the opposite of pluralistic (and is not mere monism...).
So here I'll briefly observe (or claim!) that the pluralism of Hannah Arendt can be brought to bear on the OP question. In this immediate context, for example, her writings about totalitarianism would hopefully be illuminating (I think they are). Per Arendt, there are very few regimes that are "truly" totalitarian, for her criteria of inclusion in the set are very precise. Historically, a sustained argument is available for the conclusion that, using Arendt's criteria, then besides the Nazi and Soviet regimes which she understood in these terms, there has been only one strong other example, which occurred after Arendt's death: the Khmer Rouge system in Cambodia. (Slightly looser, but still allowable, sets of criteria might fold in a few more cases; but "ideally," one will not come to believe that totalitarianism has ever been in the relevant sense "normal.") But so, to use some naive language about these things, we might claim that there have been two left-wing totalitarian systems to the one Nazi one. (In fact, this would be wrong to say, because as Arendt clearly demonstrates, Stalin was not left-wing, and Hitler was not right-wing, and neither were they the opposite, but in some surprising, but authentic, way, they were centrists (or more similar, thematically, to centrists/moderates than to ardent right- or left-wingers).) And then, for the sake of being "fair and balanced," we could point out that in the US, there is only one actual totalitarian movement, and it is a right-wing one, so now there have been two major right-wing totalitarian movements, and two major left-wing ones, after all.A
ANevermind that to suppose this, that the contours of history are shaped by the prejudices of the statement, "The left/right distinction is exhaustive," is not recommended. Because again, Stalin and Hitler, and so then Pol Pot, should not be thought of as on the left/right spectrum, or not on either of those ends. According to Arendt, there is something about being committed to right-wing or left-wing values that is incompatible with the commitment-free values of the totalitarian mindset. So too, Christian extremism is not right-wing (and of course "certainly" not left-wing, either); in fact, on structuralist grounds, the reconstructionist sample counts as "progressive" (in that they envision the transformation as progress towards an ideal, albeit a very menacing one).
Lastly, there is a sense in which the default practical expression of pluralism, in this case, is to generally permit the kind of action in question, but of course not to force people to do this. Or, in other words, the mainline debate itself is not, "Punishing people for doing it vs. punishing people for not doing it," but, "Punishing people for doing it vs. not punishing people for doing it." Now, to maintain a system of punishment is what makes a government have the most real, physical power. So there is an exact coincidence between a system's propensity towards retribution, and its propensity to oppression, already; so again, the "default" pluralist standpoint is the less-retributive, and hence less-oppressive, one.
Moreover, let's suppose that what seems intuitively "bad" about abortion is not just any example of it, but especially the later-term ones. Even so, there are well-known, acceptable reasons women can have for delaying contraception. A pluralist might worry less about figuring out "exactly when" the threshold of importance is, and instead propose ameliorating the environmental conditions that make earlier-term abortions dangerous for these women (when all things morally considered, shouldn't they be safer???).
Explanation of the given answer
Since a pluralist approach to some problem X should probably not be very strong/assertive, I haven't seen fit to use pluralism as a premise from which to derive a specific conclusion (to the relatively more specific problem of US reproductive-rights policies). For example, suppose we said, "'Leave it to the states' is the solution." But then can't we be pluralists about this, too? I mean, wouldn't an ardent pluralist (almost a contradiction in terms!) first entertain a diverse range of responses to the abortion question, but secondly go on to reflect on the diverse range of responses to the previous diverse range of responses, and so on and on ad indefinitum?
Abstractions aside, it is not clear that the weight of the disagreement over reproductive-rights policies, stateside, is between metaphysical disputants. That is, if we frame it as Aristotelian/Thomistic thinkers vs. scientism-minded/secularism advocates, well, there aren't many of the former. The more politically charged, aggressive anti-abortion group is motivated, to be sure, by metaphysical assumptions that the secularists don't share (i.e., the evidentiary viability of the transcendental argument for God, and the proposal of the "sensus deitas"). Moreover, there is a nontrivial, explicitly totalitarian subset of the religious groups involved in the dispute; other things being equal, a totalitarian won't favor a pluralistic solution to this or that problem, so trying to apply pluralism directly to the issue, here, might not be very effective.
