Are there non-religious variants of moral realism that defend the existence of objectively evil thoughts, intentions, and desires?

Question

In many religions, not only actions but also thoughts, intentions, and desires can be considered evil, even if no action is taken. For instance, Jesus said that lustful thoughts count as adultery, and feeling anger or hatred towards someone counts as murder, even if the act is never committed. In these religious contexts, God determines what is good and evil. However, if we remove God from the picture, who or what determines that certain thoughts, feelings, or desires are objectively evil and wrong?

I'm interested in non-religious ethical theories that defend moral realism and assert that thoughts, feelings, and desires can be objectively wrong even if never acted upon. Can such moral judgments be made and defended without relying on religious doctrines or a divine moral arbiter? How can it be argued that merely having lustful thoughts is objectively wrong without appealing to religious dogma? Similarly, how can it be argued that merely feeling hatred towards someone is objectively wrong without appealing to religious dogma? In particular, how is the case for objectivity made?

Answer 1

“Immanuel Kant: Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals” starts

Nothing in the world — or out of it! — can possibly be conceived that could be called ‘good’ without qualification except a GOOD WILL. […] What makes a good will good? It isn’t what it brings about, its usefulness in achieving some intended end. Rather, good will is good because of how it wills — i.e. it is good in itself.

See Kant: Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Moral.

Kant is one of the strictest proponents to assess morality solely by the intention of the person, not by the person’s actions. Kant’s arguments are not based on religion. His approach to morality is part of his rather abstract theory of pure rationality.

For an introduction see Groundwork, for a more in depth investigation see Kant on Morality.

Answer 2

Aristotle's ethics might qualify as an example of what you describe. He doesn't speak much about thoughts and intentions, but he does regard emotions such as envy and spite to be morally wrong.

According to Aristotle, morality is rooted in character traits or dispositions. The just person does not weigh up whether to act justly in some situation, but rather they act justly because it is in their character to do so. This trait or disposition arises initially from training and instruction in childhood. Later in adulthood it is cultivated by reflecting upon and developing practical wisdom.

So for Aristotle, morality is fundamentally about character. Virtuous actions flow from a virtuous character. A good person does not tolerate evil desires because they are incompatible with virtue.

Answer 3

1. So-called "lustful thoughts" are normal manifestations of human sexuality and libido. Attempting to label such thoughts as inherently evil or sinful is an attempt to induce guilt or shame, which can then be used as control or manipulation. Natural sexual desires and attractions are a healthy part of human biology and psychology.

2. The non-religious variants of moral realism that try to defend 'objectively evil thoughts' are, in my view, simply secularized versions of religious guilt-mongering. They're attempts to maintain control over people's inner lives without the convenient boogeyman of a deity. Thoughts are just thoughts. It's what we do that matters. A civilized society judges people on their actions, not on their private mental states. Anything else is an invitation to tyranny, whether it comes dressed in religious robes or philosophical jargon. The real evil, if you want to use that term, is in trying to convince people that their natural thoughts are somehow wrong or sinful. That's a recipe for neurosis, not morality.

Answer 4

My sense is that Jesus should be heard but not taken too literally.
The following may help us to hear him right

When there is righteousness in the heart, there is beauty in the character
When there is beauty in the character, there is harmony in the home
When there is harmony in the home, there is order in the nation
When there is order in the nation, there is peace in the world

Confucius
^{via Scott Rowe}

Likewise

Watch your thoughts, they become your words
Watch your words, they become your actions
Watch your actions, they become your habits
Watch your habits, they become your character
Watch your character, it becomes your destiny

Typically attributed to Lao Tzu
Though likely more modern

Answer 5

Assuming we would agree that there are objectively evil actions, maybe we could think of it this way: Is there any real difference between an intention to commit an objectively evil action, versus calling that an objectively evil intention? If a person is intending to do something objectively evil, and if he is aware that the action is objectively evil, then he clearly intends to do evil. It seems that we could not call that anything other than an objectively evil intention, and the supporting thoughts and desires surrounding it, objectively evil thoughts and desires, to the full extent that intents and thoughts and desires can be objective in any other context.

To me, any such distinction between these would be quite forced, as they all share the same quality. Religious or not, I believe Jesus' words that you allude to are quite objective, if we think about it; just as the fruit starts with the blossom, evil action starts with evil thought and intent; and just as the blossom ripens toward the fruit, evil thoughts and intents ripen toward evil action.

Answer 6

In order to be a moral agent one needs to have a commitment to speak the truth and to certain basic moral norms or patterns of action. This commitment, in crucial situations, needs to be practically as strong or direct as perception.

I do not choose to see the things which I in fact see; my perceptions may be partially illusionary (or delusional), but it's all I got. (That is, all I got at any moment of time. We can train ourselves to be better, more careful observers. Perception is not an all-or-nothing phenomenon.) Similarly with feelings and dispositions: I may be afraid to act, but somehow find it in myself to still do so. Or I may be tempted to to act, but somehow still find it in myself to refrain from acting. When I feel guilty or proud about something, I did not choose (at that moment in time) to feel that way; it's just a psychological given which will propel me forward; I will only occasionally, in a limited way be able to "take a step back" and reflect on those feelings and perhaps tweak them - again analogous to perception.

I believe we're all aware of this and we all recognize the necessity of commitment (which I consider a better word than "intent" or "intention") in performing morally praise-worthy and blame-worthy actions. Moral realism has some sense, but only in sofar as it expresses (in an akward and misguided way), the "givenness" of this commitment; only in sofar as our specific reflexive moral feelings, intentions, dispositions (like guilt or courage) are (at any moment in time) "given" to an individual.

Without assuming moral realism we can establish "objective" norms by (1) expressing those norms as clearly as possible (or putting forward certain examples, telling stories and parables) and (2) achieving intersubjective agreement about them (agreement about what those norms are - that is, how to recognize actions falling under them - and agreement about how to relate different norms and values to each other).

If we do so, we might or might not also assume moral realism as theory. But (assuming moral realism is coherent) what would be gained by that? Would it make one's commitment stronger? Would it somehow ensure that all norms we established are unchangeable? Would it really change why we are committed to this or that norm or value?

If the source or evaluative basis of our ethical norms is a transcendent divine source, how does that help in making the norm more "objective"? Do we (have to) follow the norm because a sacred text posits it as God's command and because otherwise God will punish us, or does God command this or that norm because acting in that way is good? Is God an autocratic God and ethics basically a form of blind obedience? Or does the particular selection of values -- for instance, the values expressed in the Sermon on the Mount, the value of care for the vulnerable, the value of social justice, or the value of universal brother- and sisterhood -- does that reveal something about what or how God is?

If it's the last, then, in the eyes of a religious person it might be strange that an unbeliever doesn't see ("as through a glass darkly") God in those values or in living according those values, but this also seems to imply that we all can (in principle) make those same evaluations without having to refer to a divine source (or without being aware that there is a divine source behind it).

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Now, speaking of sexual morality. According to Matthew 19:12

there are eunuchs who have made themselves eunuch for the sake of the kingdom of heaven

One of the early, very important church fathers, Origenes of Alexandria, took this quite seriously - and literally - and either castrated himself or had someone else perform this operation on him. (Medieval monks were also not as prudish as modern Christians, so Wikipedia includes some colorful illustrations of the act.) Most Christian men have not followed him in this. Who was "right"? How did the fact that all those men saw and see the Gospels as God's Word help them decide which values and norms actually to follow?

Answer 7

It's not only religion that deals with morality. In fact, when we speak about moral actions or intentions in everyday life, we rarely refer to religion. They have an existence by themselves.

People had the sense and criteria of morality well before the Ten Commandments made their appearance.

Ethics was a very favorite subject among ancient Greek philosophers, who rarely talked about religion.