I'm pretty new here, don't have the best grasp of what questions should and should not be answered, and see some conversation in the comments; let me know if there are norms I should know of and follow better!
Throughout the below I'm assuming that by 'meaning' you mean either a kind of value attributable to a life or an evaluative criteria applicable to a life that is not reducible to non-'meaning' terms. That is, I'm guessing (But only guessing!) that by 'meaning' you do not mean 'the value of a life,' since the value of a life might have nothing to do with 'meaning' (minimally but not only because meaning might not exist). Since the value of a life might consist in awareness simpliciter, the question seems self-contradictory if meaning is not a fundamental value, and so it's with that assumption I proceed below.
If you mean "is awareness of whether her life is meaningful or not required for a person to live a meaningful life?" I do not know of any philosophers who believe in 'meaningfulness' as an evaluative criteria who endorse that view. I think most philosophers who believe in 'meaning' endorse the view that the truth-value of 'is Jane's life meaningful?' can obtain independent of Jane's being aware of the truth-value of that statement.
Most philosophers, like most people, would probably say it is practically very difficult to never reflect on life and yet live a meaningful life, both because of the usefulness of reflection but maybe moreso because of the near-impossibility of a person never engaging in any kind of reflection about their life. But I don't know of any philosophers who argue that awareness of meaningfulness is a necessary condition for the existence of the meaningfulness of a life.
Of course, depending on how the meaningfulness of a life is determined, a person could think their life not meaningful while being wrong about it. In this case there would be 'awareness' of something but they would fail to have knowledge on most accounts of knowledge, inasmuch as most accounts of knowledge require knowledge being true. For example, if Christianity is true and the meaning of our lives is to worship God and accept Christ in our hearts but a person lives their life never believing in God instead believing that life is meaningless, their life would have been meaningful both without them being aware of it and with them being aware of something wrong.
If the meaning of a life is not subjectively determined, like in the case of Christianity being true, then all lives are meaningful regardless of any individual's orientation towards their own life. If meaning is entirely subject-dependent it still can be capable of obtaining in the absence of conscious reflection, if meaningfulness is a property that does not depend on a person's being aware of it, e.g. if a person finds certain things to be meaningful and engages in those activities fortuitously without having given the entire process much thought. Like a person could see red without reflecting on redness, even if meaningfulness is perception-dependent (as redness is) a person could live a meaningful life without being reflectively aware of it. If, however, meaningfulness is a property dependent on a reflective-deliberative process, then awareness would be required.
If you mean "is conscious experience a precondition for life to be meaningful" I think most philosophers would argue it is, on the condition that meaning exists.
Of course, if meaning does not exist, is not valuable, or is a complex whose value obtains entirely from something more fundamental that can exist independent of meaning, then the above does not so much apply.
If by meaning you mean simply what is valuable, there are various traditions in which the cultivation of awareness is identified as the value of a life. For example, in Theravada Buddhism the Buddha says that we should orient ourselves towards enlightenment. Notably, though, he does not argue that we should do so because it is the meaning of our lives; rather, he thinks it is good to do so from the perspective of philosophical hedonism.