There aren't such examples, really. At least, not in a universal, logical sense; in a statistical sense, there are certainly ideas that a majority of religious people alive today would hold and that a majority of secular people would disagree with.
The fundamental issue is that the question casts a very broad net by contrasting religious reasoning in general with secular reasoning in general. The question even acknowledges this breadth by referring to secular ethical systems in plural: the ethics associated with democracy, communism, capitalism, ethnic supremacy, libertarianism, anarchism and so forth can a priori all be secular, despite their vast differences.
That is to say, secular reasoning is simply a term that refers to any reasoning that is not religious; as such, it can justify anything that one pleases, as long as it does not require belief in divinities, the supernatural, and so forth.
For instance, perhaps a religion says that people should not eat pork because God has so decreed it. That is a religious argument. But one can imagine any number of secular arguments for the same: people should not eat pork because all living creatures have value, because pigs are anatomically very similar to humans, because pork production is bad for the environment, because pigs have too many parasites, because red meat is bad for one's health, or because pork is just disgusting, man. These arguments need not even be correct—they are still secular, and there are people who believe all of them.
In fact, there's evidence to suggest that a large proportion of religious prescriptions and proscriptions are little more than the secular perceived common sense of their original milieu, codified and given a divine mandate in order to encourage compliance.
Less obviously, secular reasoning can even justify most arguments that do directly relate to religious matters (e.g. "people should worship deities") through arguments like "This religion is obviously false, but people should follow its dictates because it connects them with their cultural history/it will help me attain political power/it promotes societal cohesion/most people here already believe it, so why rock the boat." These are purely secular arguments that do not rely on the truth of any religion, and yes, people have made all of them.
In short, the answer is that secular reasoning, writ large, can justify essentially anything that religious reasoning can. There can be a secular argument for anything that a religion promotes, albeit that any secular arguments for intrinsically religious strictures like "people should believe in God" will very likely be somewhat cynical ones.
Regarding the part about whether the disagreements "can be resolved based on reason and evidence," I would have to say, sometimes. Reason and evidence can resolve disagreements on facts, so in theory (for instance) someone might be convinced to became an atheist (or believe in a deity) on the basis on evidence. Contra Searle, I do not think they can usually resolve fundamental differences in moral axioms, though they may convince someone that they have reasoned incorrectly from them; for instance, "You believe that God's most fundamental commandment is loving your neighbor but you also think that it's fine to hate them because their skin color is different" might convince someone if the first part is actually their belief.
That said, in some cases, it may not be necessary for secular ethical systems and religious ethical systems to agree—is it necessarily an issue for most secular ethical systems that Jews and Muslims think it is wrong to eat pork, as long as the latter are not forcing the secular reasoner not to eat it? On the other hand, in some cases—at least from my ethical perspective, and from many others—certain religious beliefs might be too negative to leave unchallenged, such as the aforementioned "God wants me to hate my neighbor because of their skin color"; unfortunately, people are likely to either not be convinced to change their beliefs at all, or if they are persuaded, to be persuaded by appeals to implicit moral beliefs that are actually more important to them than the bigotry that they justify with religion (e.g. "I realized that group X are actually nice people, and I can't really hate anyone who is nice to me.")