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I experience inner speech as I am composing speech and also reading text.

This experience of inner speech is similar to experiencing the sound my mind experiences when it hears spoken words.

Sound is considered a qualia, such as the falling of a tree or the language a human uses to communicate.

Is therefore my experience of my inner speech a qualia, since sound is considered a qualia?

If inner speech, an element of consciousness, is qualia, then is at least part of our conscious experience qualia?

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  • Sounds and inner speech themselves are not qualia, only first person experiences of them, or of anything else, are.
    – Conifold
    Commented Aug 11 at 11:50
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    My first-person experience of the sound of language and inner speech are the same. However, my experience of the sound of bangs, etc, my thoughts can not recreate like my inner speech, although I can recognise and associate the sound of bangs to a particular cause.@Conifold
    – 8Mad0Manc8
    Commented Aug 11 at 12:03
  • not everyone has an inner voice, same as not everyone having mental imagery, but it's similar to reading, when "we may also undergo a variety of emotions and feelings. We may feel tense, bored, excited, uneasy, angry. Once all these reactions are removed, together with the images of an inner voice and the visual sensations produced by reading, some would say (myself included) that no phenomenology remains."
    – andrós
    Commented Aug 11 at 18:59
  • As a non-native speaker, I can't parse the sentence "If therefore an element..." Would you be willing to rephrase? Is it a question that should end with a question mark?
    – Jens
    Commented Aug 12 at 9:13
  • @Jens Sure I'll edit rhe body of the question you are referring too.
    – 8Mad0Manc8
    Commented Aug 13 at 17:32

5 Answers 5

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The paper Inner Speech by Alderson-Day and Fernyhough from 2015 seems a comprehensive survey about the phenomenon of “Inner speech” from the viewpoint of current psychology:

Inner speech can be defined as the subjective experience of language in the absence of overt and audible articulation.

The authors deal with two theoretical approaches under the title “Comparing Vygotskian and Working Memory”. They do not consider inner speech a quale.

See also the entry Inner Speech at Stanford Online Encyclopedia.

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  • +1 Two excellent references, thank you!
    – J D
    Commented Aug 11 at 18:07
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    wait, why do you supose they "do not consider inner speech a quale"? there is no mention of qualia in the article
    – andrós
    Commented Aug 11 at 18:41
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    @andròs Because the authors in their comprehensive(!) paper do not mention qualia as relevant for inner speech. In addition: Language is much more complex and differentiated than qualia. - Nevertheless, I know: Absence of evidence is no evidence for absence :-)
    – Jo Wehler
    Commented Aug 12 at 8:28
  • that is indeed the case @JoWehler and it wasn't a rhetoriccal question, so you get a tick
    – andrós
    Commented Aug 12 at 8:28
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    Conifold's definition of quale includes all first person experience. Which per this paper, inner speech satisfies.
    – Dcleve
    Commented Aug 12 at 15:00
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More or less, yes. I'd say inner speech is qualia - plural. It is a batching of different kinds of qualia at the same time: sensory and emotional/attitudinal. It has parallels to speaking to another person, which is where I am getting my sense it is plural. Perhaps your inner speech is reminding, chastizing, worrying, etc., yourself. My own experience is that even fairly neutral inner speech has an attitude and this can be felt if one focuses on that aspect of it. In addition it has a kind of 'sound' quale. That seems like the minimum number of qualia at any given moment. There can also be images, at least for me. If my inner speech is along the lines of 'Oh, my God, what have I done?' I may also be getting an image of my boss' face. Perhaps it should be called 'inner communication' in that case.

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    @andros I have a sense of humour. However, my mind is really not that interesting :-)
    – 8Mad0Manc8
    Commented Aug 11 at 22:16
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    @andrós Two answer both your comments. As far as I know, I do not have thought alienation. I do not feel my thoughts. I experience them similar to 'sound' in my mind. I feel abstract emotions such as anger and frustration, and i physically 'feel' hot and cold. To answer your last comment, 'an interesting mind?' Sorry to be absolute, but not a dull one. My favourite island is IBIZA, the rave culture is amazing and very interesting, I've had a misspent youth and now have an aching back and mental health problems as a result of it. But whatta you going to do !!
    – 8Mad0Manc8
    Commented Aug 13 at 19:18
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    i definitely do feel my thoughts @8Mad0Manc8 ! ibiza is a party island alright
    – andrós
    Commented Aug 13 at 19:45
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    @andrós Yeah. I don't doubt you, it's a crazy old world. and it's a privilege to experience it.
    – 8Mad0Manc8
    Commented Aug 13 at 19:58
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    hedon is a beuatiful thing man
    – andrós
    Commented Aug 13 at 21:28
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I have a thorough understanding of inner speech, as it was the topic of my Master's thesis. However, I do not have a good recollection of the notion of qualia. Therefore I will focus on the inner speech aspect and hopefully it will indirectly address the connection between the two.

Inner speech definitely has a subjective component and it is also measurable in the brain. As a matter of fact, it lights up nearly precisely the same regions of the brain as actual speech. For instance, the temporal lobe responsible partly for hearing is activated (We imagine that we hear our inner speech, and the brain seems to be fooled into thinking we are really hearing it). This comes as close to being subjective, private conscious experience as one can possibly have without actually measuring consciousness.

In the middle of the 20th century, there were also attempts being made to measure the vocal chords and other speaking apparatuses to see if inner speech and its close cousin "thinking" could be measured by miniscule movements. Some of these studies seemed promising, though fMRI studies decades later far dwarfed these efforts.

Furthermore, the process of voice hearing for schizophrenic patients even lights up similar regions to everyday inner speech of neurotypical people. The only difference is that a person with schizophrenia on some level loses the notion that it is them creating the inner speech, and also loses the ability to predict what the inner speech is going to be. So if a schizophrenic voice could reasonably be defined as a qualia (again, I don't know much about what qualia actually are), the inner speech could also be close to that.

Finally, preliminary studies show that each person has a descriptive for their inner speech. Almost everyone does experience inner speech and some will say it sounds like their own voice, some like a generic nondescript voice, some will say it sounds like different characters such as if they are thinking about Lord of the Rings it may sound British, or if they are saying something deep it may sound like Morgan Freeman.

In my opinion, inner speech does classify as an experience. Some people have particularly rich inner voices, such as writers, academics, and those in contemplative traditions.

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  • Thanks for your answer. I thought there must be a correltion between the two amd since in your thesis it is a measurable relation then it confirm my intuition that these two phenomenon are related. Howver I have to admit the purpose of my question was to affirm a dualism of the mind and body and not to affirm a philosophical position of physicalism which your thesis would support.
    – 8Mad0Manc8
    Commented Aug 12 at 7:15
  • I'd just like the raise the issue that what we take as our inner voice may not be. We could take this metaphorically (sort of) and frame some of our inner speech as introjects: unconsciously adopt the ideas or attitudes of others (the definition of the verb form). We might notice for example that the speech the inner speech uses is like our father, for example. Then I'd like to take this a step further and throw out, for the purposes of exploration, if it might even be literal. Perhaps the schizophenics are in some way correct, at least metaphorically but not trivially. Perhaps even more so. Commented Aug 12 at 15:01
  • I have a question about your thesis and I ask it with complete respect for it. Do you think it will ever be possible to correlate the measurements you have recorded with the content of the thought those measurements gave?
    – 8Mad0Manc8
    Commented Aug 13 at 20:19
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Yes. Everything that can be felt is a quale, including thinking, recalling, etc.

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When reading up on qualia to see whether there is a definition that is well suited for this question, I had to chuckle when it says that "[...] the importance of qualia hinges on the definition of the term". It seems like every answer I write here contains that aspect - it depends. Philosophers...

That said, one particularly practical definition (or rather approximation) of what qualia are is Daniel Dennetts: "the ways things seem to us". According to Dennett, qualia have these four attributes (more or less, exceptions notwithstanding):

  • ineffable – they cannot be communicated, or apprehended by any means other than direct experience.
  • intrinsic – they are non-relational properties, which do not change depending on the experience's relation to other things.
  • private – all interpersonal comparisons of qualia are systematically impossible.
  • directly or immediately apprehensible by consciousness – to experience a quale is to know one experiences a quale, and to know all there is to know about that quale.

Inner Speech certainly does "seem to be something to (at least some of) us", and those four criteria also seem to match.

So yes, Inner Speech is a quale.

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  • Dennett's list is only approximations, his criteria are not met absolutely. "Ineffable", not fully. We can communicate about Quales. "intrinsic" -- Quales change relationally, see conifer travis's answer. Private -- not fully. We can compare, say, how colors make us feel, and how they shade into each other in a rainbow. "immediately apprehensible" again not fully true. Dennett himself put much effort into finding cases where we are confused about our quales. This set of properties are only approximately true of qualia.
    – Dcleve
    Commented Aug 12 at 14:58
  • Let's take these as rules of thumb, or more like a guideline, @Dcleve? I have relaxed the word "definition" in the answer and added your "approximation".
    – AnoE
    Commented Aug 12 at 15:03
  • Yes, these are useful generalities. Note, however, that Dennett himself takes them as absolutes, and cites the exceptions as justification for his case that Qualia do not exist -- so the "guidelines" principle is not agreed to by Dennett!
    – Dcleve
    Commented Aug 12 at 15:25
  • It's not a question of definition. Sound, taste, the colour red, the feeling of soft or hard, the smell of smoke and the result each of these senses are personal qualities that cannot be explained by physics, quantum mechanics, classical mechanics, general relativity, special relativity or any other theory, other than the emotional commen sense of the people that experience them..
    – 8Mad0Manc8
    Commented Aug 13 at 21:05
  • Yes, that's what the bullet points in my answer say, @8Mad0Manc8?
    – AnoE
    Commented Aug 14 at 7:20

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