Is there a significant difference between human intuition and animal intuition? [closed]

Question

Most of people's decisions are actually made by intuition, for example, when you cross the road, even if there is a car coming, but you judge that it is safe to cross the road at the current speed, which is a typical daily decision made by intuition.

Relying on intuition can not only help us cope with life's problems, but also help us make breakthroughs in many scientific researches and very critical moments. But it is clear that animal intuition can only cope with some routine survival problems, and in the face of some major crises, especially in the face of absolute power, animal intuition can no longer make breakthrough decisions.

In my opinion, human intuition to a large extent already contains a lot of rational knowledge as support, such as the above mentioned crossing the road, obviously contains the knowledge of speed, not just experience. For example, when we encounter a beast whose power is much stronger than ours, even if we have never encountered such a situation before, with the knowledge we have learned from various channels, we are still likely to make the decision to use the objects around us as weapons to fight it, rather than the only decision to run away like a small animal.Although human intuition is also based on a lot of genetic experience passed down from generation to generation, it is obviously not only genetic experience, but more rational knowledge accumulated in ordinary times.

So my question is, is this intuition, which involves rational knowledge, significantly different from animal intuition? If human intuition is based primarily on rational knowledge, does that mean that the line between rational and irrational behavior is blurred?

(Supplement: Whereas it has been suggested that it is not necessary to judge whether it is safe to cross the road based on rational knowledge, it can be done only by perception and training. Let's take a few more examples, such as humans confidently driving a truck into a pride of lions, or quickly moving away from the scene of a fire to avoid carbon monoxide poisoning, these are also intuitive judgments made without calculation and detection, but obviously not based on perception and training to make decisions, but the accumulation of rational knowledge. This shows that many times when we think we are relying on intuition to make judgments, we actually use a lot of rational knowledge as a basis.)

Answer 1

You ask:

So my question is, is this intuition, which involves rational knowledge, significantly different from animal intuition?

Yes. Animals don't have intuitions of rational knowledge which may actually inform non-rational cognition. That is to say, conscious logic and language is a reflection of the basis of unconscious cognition. Malcom Gladwell's Blink is a good popular exposition on this phenomenon, but there's an entire body of research on it. From the SEP's Intuition:

[R]esearch has shown that agents with sufficient experience in a given domain (e.g., neonatal nursing, fire-fighting, or chess) arrive at judgments and make decisions on the basis of a cognitive process other than conscious considerations of various options and the weighing of evidence and utilities. Such expert “intuitions” that some infant suffers from sepsis, that a fire will take a certain course, or that a certain chess move is a good one, appear immediately in consciousness

In fact, among particular philosophers of the late 20th century, it has been argued that there isn't a clear division between logic, language, and thought at all, for instance in the claims of theory-ladenness which argues that our language affects our perceptions and observations. Another philosophical proponent of the idea that our logic and language affect the spontaneity of phenomenal experience is found in the person of Wilfred Sellars who argued for the Myth of the Given. And yet a third approach to this comes from the perceptual conceptualism of McDowell in Mind and World which takes Sellars perception to an extreme. From WP's article on Conceptualism:

Thus, in rejecting the Myth of the Given, McDowell argues for perceptual conceptualism, according to which perceptual content is conceptual "from the ground up", that is, all perceptual experience is a form of conceptual experience.

Thus, according to a number of philosophers of mind, the construction of our spontaneous phenomenal experience is either impacted by our language and concepts or is wholly a product of them! This isn't the language of thought hypothesis (which has been thoroughly rejected after the advent of cognitive science and psycholinguistics) but rather a fundamental claim that our language-adjacent faculties directly shape our cognition which is mainly driven by intuition. See Embodied Cognition (SEP) for a the basis of naturalized epistemology which drives these sorts of contemporary philosophical claims.

Even signing gorillas lack the ability to form complicated grammars and express complex concepts. Therefore, any animal, even though capable of manipulating basic signs (parrots and dogs even have that facility for instance), don't have the language faculties to cogitate in the complex fashion humans do. Modern science has shown us animals share many perceptual features of consciousness with us (Sorry, Descartes, not mere automatons!), but the intuitional and conscious use of rational knowledge puts a huge gulf between us and even our closest Great Ape cousins. See Animal Consciousness (SEP), Inner Speech (SEP), and the extensive body of work by the primatologist Frans de Waal for differences between how we and animals think.