It seems to me that in practical terms the answer to the title question is a clear yes. To get people (including ourselves) to align with a moral principle or framework, we need to have desires and/or emotions engaged. Consequentialist positions will generally assume or appeal to our distaste for or desire for/liking of certain consequences. However much we frame this in logical arguments, we'll having little motivation to align with the moral arguments if we don't care about either the purported negative and postive consequences the consequentialist is trying to decrease and increase respectively.
Also, whatever the goal is will include a value-driven assessment.
With deontology, we may, yes, dislike the rules. However, in religious deontologies there are generally threats of unpleasant consequences, appeals to our owing a deity, appeals to, of course, wanting to align with the greatest of all beings, guilt around not doing one's duty, etc. On a motivational level religious deontology depends on all sorts of appeals to emotion and deisre - carrots and sticks, with emotional effects often. I think beyond the motivational necessity of appealing to emotions in religious deontology, it is inherent in the assumptions regarding the relationship with the deity. Of course you will do what the loving Father suggests, how could you not? I don't mean to offend any religious people by what is likely a serious oversimplification, but it seems to me there are emotional appeals similar to this either explicitly stated or assumed/implied.
Secular deontologies, anything from Kant (sort of secular, but influential on secular deontologies) to rights-based deontologies all have some kind of emotional appeal on both the motivational side - listen to any disucssion of the violation of rights and you will necessarily hear emotional appeals or they will simply be implicit - we all know that's bad or good because of what it feels like contemplating not having a right to privacy, etc. And deontologists often engage in consequentialist arguments about what happens if we don't follow the rules, and these will have appeal emotion components.
This is getting long but I think virtue ethics (the name itself already points to the appeals) also has appeals to emotion - admiration, for example - built in. I'll leave that argument gestural.
Even in ethical systems that lead to people striving to have what might be rather unpleasant experiences and states, there is a value judgment that the states of the ethical person or the consequences of the actions or the relationship the framework honors is emotionally appealing. In other words, I am not in any way arguing that all ethical systems boil down to a (perhaps deeply buried) hedonism. In fact, the appeal could be, for example, the nobility and honoring the deity in asceticism or self-flagellation. And while these 'lifestyles' may have secondary gains, I see no reason to assume that people having these lifestyles have a net gain of pleasure nor to I think they are motivated by those possible secondary gains.
To sum up I'd say appeals to emotion are a part of normative claims and systems. Appeals to emotion are problematic in non-nomrative discussions. They can, of course, also be misused in normative discussions, but are nevertheless necessary, given what we are and what the topic is.