Do virtues ever lead us to do the morally wrong thing?

Question

It is commonly asserted that someone’s compassion might lead them to act wrongly, to tell a lie they should not have told, for example, in their desire to prevent someone else’s hurt feelings. It is also said that courage, in a desperado, enables him to do far more wicked things than he would have been able to do if he were timid.

Though I haven't given it much thought, I cannot think of what virtue could explain besides rightness/wrongness

a virtue ethical account need not attempt to reduce all other normative concepts to virtues and vices. What is required is simply (i) that virtue is not reduced to some other normative concept that is taken to be more fundamental and (ii) that some other normative concepts are explained in terms of virtue and vice.

But I do suppose that virtue does not always lead to what is best or good. Does that meet the two requirements of virtue ethics above, and what's wrong/good about that approach? I am guessing it ignores the adequacy objection

It is possible to perform a right action without being virtuous and a virtuous person can occasionally perform the wrong action without that calling her virtue into question.

But I am not sure that the objection is great. Can something be the right course of action but still not be the best?

Answer 1

Let's set some basics. Let's set up Aristotle's situation. Virtue and vice describe habits. There are habits of the body, but also habits of the intellect. So there are at least two kinds of virtue, and two kinds of vice.

Secondly, moral reasoning is manifestly not the same thing as the practice of virtue (or vice). Most notably, moral reasoning is not constrained by the practical binary of vice vs virtue due to the manifest fact moral reasoning is not reasoning about habit per se (how to be habitual) but clearly moral reasoning involves reasoning about both habit and consequences.

So two basics: a virtue is a habit of at least two major different (but perhaps cooperative) kinds; and moral reasoning about habit is not itself an exercise of virtue, that is to say, a mere habit.

In moral reasoning we judge habit and consequence. I would suggest two categories of moral judgment escape the binary limitations of virtue and vice, the heroic and the tragic. The heroic is virtue unasked for, the tragic is bad consequences unasked for; neither acts are "simply" virtuous or vicious. The hero has made no habit; the tragic person intended no harm.

In sum, it is reasonable and easy to understand virtue ethics only superficially appears as a binary system. Moral reasoning about virtue, which would include virtue ethics theory, never only thinks about habit, inasmuch as such reasoning is also cognizant of the realm of consequences.

This confusion is unfortunate if we wish to utilize Aristotle. The full scope of moral reasoning is something that the virtue itself does not need to presuppose, as Aristotle intended. The system produces heroes and tragedies (and cowards and criminals), but it is likely the best we can do. But that is my opinion. A habitual belief I hold.

I leave open the question as to "What then is moral reasoning?" Virtue and vice are good places to start, is the best I can offer. I'm not a know-it-all. That is why I like virtue ethics. Aristotle was talking about me when he said we need habits, not reasoning first. My teachers alone will testify this is so very true.

Answer 2

This will likely depend on the particular formulation of virtue ethics involved, but for Aristotle a virtue's exercise is only such in the particular context of an individual:

Thus a master of any art avoids excess and defect, but seeks the intermediate and chooses this—the intermediate not in the object but relatively to us. (1106a24-1106b7, translated by W. D. Ross)

For Aristotle it does not seem that someone could virtuous in an action and be doing something morally wrong:

Again, it is possible to fail in many ways (for evil belongs to the class of the unlimited, as the Pythagoreans conjectured, and good to that of the limited), while to succeed is possible only in one way (for which reason one is easy and the other difficult—to miss the mark easy, to hit it difficult); for these reasons also, then, excess and defect are characteristic of vice, and the mean of excellence; For men are good in but one way, but bad in many (1106b29-1106b34)

For more everday uses of the term virtue I think it is possible for someone to act virtuously but wrong, as we might praise somebody's commitment to honesty even though we think it is mistake for them not to lie.

Or, I think we could be consequentialists and still use the term virtue to refer to certain character traits that are generally admirable even if their expression in a particular instance we judge to be morally bad on consequentialist grounds.

Answer 3

We have to be careful with the conceptualization of virtue ethics, because the understanding of 'virtue' has changed significantly over time. In the original formulation, virtue meant something like a perfection of the human form, be it mental or physical. Thus, every event we see in the Olympics was considered a cultivation of a virtue, as were poetics, mathematics, art, and philosophy. It was often conceptualized in terms of Platonic ideals, where there was an ideal form of each of these that humans strove to achieve. Ethics itself was a particular virtue, but 'good' and 'evil' in the modern sense weren't the focus of it. However, there was a general sense that the more one worked towards particular virtues, the more admirable and generally virtuous one became.

In the shift from the Greco-Roman world to the Western Christian world the concept of virtue changed from an appeal to an ideal human form to an appeal to an ideal divine law. Spiritual perfection became all important, and self-perfection became subordinate, irrelevant, or even sinful. We can see the former in things like the Arthurian legends where martial perfection was irrevocably wedded to divine favor, ands the latter in concepts like mortification of the flesh, where people would physically punish themselves for impure thoughts or acts.

So when we talk about virtue ethics we have to be careful of modality. I mean, Simone Biles has developed what the Greeks would call physical virtues to an extreme, and I'll even credit her with having developed philosophical virtues from the way she is respected and held by her teammates and the general public. But I have a hard time imagining her donning shining armor to pit her physical prowess against the forces of evil.The best I can do here is to take Socrates' line of argument and suggest that cultivating any virtue implies the cultivation of particular mental virtues — diligence, responsibility, courage, focused effort, fairness — that we tend to some up as strength of character. And for someone to choose to embody strength of character they must first develop some aspects of wisdom, because only through wisdom does one see the failings of dissipative pleasure, distraction, avoidance, bitterness, and other fruitless but sometimes satisfying occupations. The development of virtue doesn't make one immune to moral wrongs, but it makes one more conscious of them, and more likely to redress them when they occur.

Answer 4

Of course Virtue ethics can lead someone to do something morally wrong per consequentialist ethics. Virtue ethics focus on the internal state of the actor, not the external consequences. Or the rights of moral subjects, thus potentially being wrong by violating rights ethics. Or wrong per a DIFFERENT virtue ethic.

Pursuers of the Samurai Code, for example, will execute POWs, because they have shamed themselves -- violating all sorts of other ethical norms.

Aesthetes, pursuers of the creation of beauty, or of uniqueness, will generally be poor marriage partners, and terrible parents.

This is not a new insight. The Greek tragedies were generally written around conflicts between aspects of the classic virtues, or around virtue principles that led to wrong actions.

Virtue ethics takes account of a key insight of psychology -- that one of the consequences of our actions is the development of our own character, and the character of others, and this should be a major consideration in one's moral thinking. The solely exterior considerations of utilitarian ethics, for example, leave character development entirely out of their calculations, and have been criticized as a result for their failure to develop character-based skills in the agent themselves, or prioritize their development in others. Raising children, for example, is an excellent area to apply Virtue ethics thinking TO the child, as part of one's consequentialist prioritization of one's actions, rather than utilitarianism. Maximizing children's short-term happiness is a terrible way to raise productive and admirable adults.

But for Virtue Ethics to be a useful moral guide, I consider it to need to follow a tiered priority of virtues.

The first tier is the greater virtues: Love, Truth, Agency, and Beauty, which I believe need to be prioritized in that order. Agency and Beauty in particular can lead to very suspect moral choices, so should be treated as a lower tier than the first two, or perhaps just part of the next set.

There are multiple secondary virtues, like stick-tuitiveness, loyalty, skill development, integrity, courage, cleverness, etc., which are valuable additional guidelines, but also should be balanced against other moral theories.

A useful question to ask oneself -- could pursuing this virtue put me in a situation similar to the Greek Tragedies? If so, it is best to treat the virtue as advisory, and consider other moral theories as well.