What does Derrida mean by "presence"?

Question

Derrida is known for arguing that phenomenology, despite its intentions, remains a form of metaphysics (cf. Derrida, J. (1982) [1972]. Margins of Philosophy, trans. A. Bass (Brighton: Harvester Press).

Even though phenomenology aimed to make a fresh start, it uncritically adopted several core metaphysical concepts and categories, thereby staying within the same framework of thought it wanted to break away from. One of the central ideas it held onto is the notion of presence. In traditional metaphysics, being is defined as identity in presence. Although Husserlian phenomenology tried to move beyond this idea, it ultimately did not succeed. It continued to assume that identity is more fundamental than difference, closeness more original than distance, and that presence comes before any form of absence or negativity.

What does Derrida mean here by "presence"?

Is he referring to the fact that the immediacy of phenomenological analysis assumes as more immediate that which "is being," such as, for instance, the present over the future, or my current self over my possible self, etc.?

Answer 1

So by a "metaphysics of presence," such as it is found in Husserl's phenomenology, can be found in both his Logical Investigations and subsequent (and many) introductions to pure phenomenology. Conifold is right in his comment to focus on the role intuition had for Husserl (let me repeat the quote Conifold found from Husserl's Ideas I):

Every originary presentive intuition is a legitimizing source of cognition, everything originarily (so to speak, in its “personal” actuality) offered to us in ‘intuition’ is to be accepted simply as what it is presented as being, but also only within the limits in which it is presented there.

While Husserl was adamantly anti-positivist in his approach, in Ideas I there are several passages where he describes his phenomenology as a purer positivism than that the empiricist positivisms of his time. How so? For Husserl the characteristic mark of evidence was in being the original source of the presentation of either an object (in the case of sensory intuitions) or an essence (for eidetic intuitions) or categorial structures (for logical or categorial intuitions). All of our discourse, whether in descriptive language or imaginative creations, must eventually refer back to some kind of original presenting of the matter at hand (sensory, eidetic, or logical).

In Logical Investigations, Husserl provides a description of how unlike speech done with other persons where language requires proper interpretation (that sometimes goes wrong), our inner or egological monologue cannot fail to express what is meant. Now, since all consciousness is a consciousness of something (intentionality), what distinguishes mere egological descriptions of various matters from genuine knowledge? Again, a reference back to some original presentation: intuition. Very often what is meant by a description far exceeds what is actually given in the description (e.g., the word 'apple' is not an apple). The satisfaction or fulfillment of an intention is, for Husserl, in a presentative intuition. An eidetic intuition is where the meant and given perfectly coincide.

This is what Derrida takes to be problematic, and his critique of Husserl's phenomenology uses Husserl's own analyses to expose the problem. Specifically, Husserl's account of time-consciousness. I'll simply summarize here. We can intuitively distinguish a harmony of tones from a melody of tones, that is, between a simultaneity and a sequence. This sort of temporal awareness cannot be a mere re-presentation of the past notes of a melody as present for that would be a consciousness of a harmony or a simultaneous set of tones. The past tones are retained as past or as absent in order to be intuitively grasped as a melody and not as a mere harmony. Our perceptual awareness is riddled with absence as informing its meaning and context, at every moment.

So according to Derrida, Husserl's very own phenomenology undermines its implicit acceptance of a metaphysics of presence, especially in regard to both the nature of being and of evidence. This is comprehensive and applies to all the "modifications" of the present (actual—possible, present—past/future, expression—indication, etc.).

Answer 2

In Derrida’s Of Grammatology Arthur Bradley says this about 'presence':

To introduce the first key premise of his thought more generally, Derrida argues that ‘grammatology’ offers us an insight into a much bigger set of philosophical assumptions, namely, the ‘metaphysics of presence [la métaphysique de la présence]’ (p. 49/71). What exactly does this forbidding term mean? It is generally understood that ‘metaphysics’ is the name for a specific branch of philosophy that seeks to locate an ultimate ground, essence or foundation of reality that lies beyond the physical or empirical world: the classic example of such a position would be Plato’s idealism which argues that our world is merely the imitation of a pre-existing world of permanent, unchanging Ideas or Forms. However, Derrida has a much more ambitious understanding of ‘metaphysics’ that encompasses the entire history of western philosophy from Plato to the present day. For Derrida, the western philosophical tradition in its entirety can be described as ‘metaphysical’ in the sense that it all seeks to establish an essential foundation for reality and, in his view, that foundation is something called ‘presence’.

Answer 3

From Conifold:

Derrida means this: "Every originary presentive intuition is a legitimizing source of cognition, everything originarily (so to speak, in its “personal” actuality) offered to us in ‘intuition’ is to be accepted simply as what it is presented as being, but also only within the limits in which it is presented there." (Husserl, Ideas I). According to Husserl, (phenomenal) presence comes before any form of reflection and is to be accepted as legitimizing itself. And according to Derrida, this makes phenomenology a form of metaphysics (of the phenomenal).