Is there a term for properties that cannot be predicated of existing things. Or one for properties that can?


See The Epistemology of Modality. We can sey that the first one are (logical or metaphysical) impossible properties, while the second one are possible.

  • ah! Interesting idea. May 31 '14 at 6:56
  • hi again... so a property that can only be predicated of things that don't exist is metaphysically impossible?
    – user6917
    May 31 '14 at 13:35
  • @user3293056 - of course, is only a sugegstion. May we say that the property of being faster than light is phyiscally impossible, while the property of being higher than itself is logically impossible. Does it make sense ? May 31 '14 at 15:09
  • Note though, that there's an important debate about whether properties are sparse or abundant. (Roughly, abundant property theorists say every true subject/predicate sentence has a property in virtue of which it is true. "Socrates is bald" is true because the object Socrates has the property baldness) If you take a sparse property view, on the other hand, you wouldn't want to say that there were things like impossible properties, I think. Perhaps somebody who knows more can correct me though.
    – user5172
    May 31 '14 at 15:12

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