Suppose m is a dry match. Under most circumstances, if m is struck, it will light. But if somebody were to wet m, then we might stipulate that m would not light even if it were struck.
Suppose S denotes the sentence "m is struck".
Suppose L denotes the sentence "m will light".
Suppose W denotes the sentence "m is wet".
Question: Is the conditional S > L true?
My intuition is that S > L is not true. This is because S is not enough for us to guarantee that L is true. For example, suppose S & W is true. Then S is true. Yet L would be false. Hence S > L is false.
The problem with this is argument is that if it is true, then almost every conditional we utter is false. When we assert conditionals like S > L, we are often conversationally implying S & ~W > L. And in fact this isn't even quite right. There could be other things besides just W that could prevent L from being true. So really, the antecedent of S > L would have to contain an infinite number of further conditions (for example, that the match isn't deprived of oxygen at the moment it is struck) to truly guarantee that L is the case.
I'm temporarily calling this argument the "Underspecificiation of Conditional Antecedents Argument (UCAA)" for why many conditionals, as uttered, could be false. Is this a common thought, and has there been much written about this argument?