Who are the main anti-realists about higher-order vagueness? Would Crispin Wright be one? And, if so, is he a universal or partial anti-realist?
1 Answer
Crispin Wright in fact denies higher-order vagueness. In that sense he's an anti-realist about that notion. See his recent paper 'The Illusion of Higher-Order Vagueness':
http://web.mit.edu/philosophy/colloquia/wright.pdf
But what does it mean to be a partial versus a universal anti-realist?
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Thanks for the reference! Wright's position on Realism suggests a possible interpretation by quantifying over different discourses which we may or may not wish to ascribe a realist notion of truth-aptness, but we might ask "are we interested in universal anti-realism whether the property is truth-apt in the same way in all discourses, or simply in some way?" Commented Jul 30, 2014 at 17:43