This may be well be one way to state what phenomenology does; although not an explicit return-to-the-Greeks, Husserl and other phenomenologists are definitely engaged with the first person study of the structures of qualia (and more generally of consciousness and intentionality.) There is a decidedly "inward" or subjective bent to these analyses:
Basically, phenomenology studies the structure of various types of experience ranging from perception, thought, memory, imagination, emotion, desire, and volition to bodily awareness, embodied action, and social activity, including linguistic activity. The structure of these forms of experience typically involves what Husserl called “intentionality”, that is, the directedness of experience toward things in the world, the property of consciousness that it is a consciousness of or about something. According to classical Husserlian phenomenology, our experience is directed toward — represents or “intends” — things only through particular concepts, thoughts, ideas, images, etc. These make up the meaning or content of a given experience, and are distinct from the things they present or mean.
(From the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry on Phenomenology.)
