Your theory suffers from some serious ambiguities. The first problem is that you haven't explained what is the relevant measure of complexity and why. This is a more difficult issue than it might appear to somebody who hasn't given it much thought. Charles Bennett has discussed these issues in many papers, such as
For example, suppose that you decide to describe the amount of information in an object by the compressibility of a description of an object. The first problem is deciding the relevant level of description, to which I will return later because it reveals deeper problems with your position. The second problem is that using standard compression algorithms the most complex sequences are random, e.g. - a series of coin tosses.
The best measure of complexity I know of that is relevant to knowledge bearing systems is Bennett's own suggestion: logical depth. The complexity is the number of steps that a universal computer would require to produce the relevant description. This avoids the coin toss problem if you include a random number generator in the computer. Random number generators are allowed by the laws of physics, e.g. - measurement results of whether a particular atom has an electron in a particular shell, so this seems reasonable.
Now, you say that any description can be interpreted as representing any other description. There is a sense in which this is true, but it would destroy your whole position if you took it seriously. For if you allow an arbitrary mapping between the description and the things to which it refers, then a sequence of random coin tosses instantiates a novel exactly as well as, say, the contents of your genes or the complete works of Shakespeare. What is required for any measure of complexity that makes sense is that you include the information required to do the relevant interpretation in the description and then consider what the item in question adds in terms of complexity. So for Shakespeare you might have to include knowledge of grammar, aesthetics, history and probably other stuff. For a gene, you would have to specify some features of the environment, including what other genes are present. For a random series of coin tosses you have to add how to identify the different sides of the coin.
To describe conscious experiences, I don't think anybody knows what the relevant description would be, nor do I think it would be the same for everybody since different people have different dispositions, ideas and so on. For an example, see
For some idea of many of the problems involved in coming up with such a description see "Consciousness Explained" by Daniel C. Dennett.
The idea raised in your question doesn't make sense. But there are many deep problems associated with the problem of how to specify complexity that are worth investigating.