This is undeniably difficult. The section at 4.1212 onwards is where he gives his take on the internal/external relations doctrine. The holding of internal relations cannot be asserted by propositions, but rather shows itself in the propositions (in den Saetzen), by an internal property of the proposition which presents a state of affairs.
A property is internal if it is unthinkable that its object does not possess it (4.123).
He also says (4.121) that propositions cannot represent logical form, which mirrors iself in propositions. “That which mirrors itself in language, language cannot represent”. A proposition shows the logical form of reality, or exhibits it (er weist sie auf).
So in this sense, what can be shown (logical form, internal structure etc) cannot be said.
Passing to “The limits of my language mean the limits of my world”. I imagine he means, consistent with what he says above, is that whatever falls within the limits of our language includes all that can be said. What can be shown, however lies outside our language, or perhaps ‘at the limit’.
Note also his remark later on at 5.6331 about the form of the visual field – hard to explain without his diagram, which shows the eye and the visual field on the page itself. He means that the eye itself would never appear in the visual field. “The subject does not belong to the world but it is a limit of the world”.
So in summary, “What can be shown, cannot be said” and “The limits of my language mean the limits of my world” are not necessarily contradictory, if ‘what can be shown’ is at the limits of language and the world.
Note also, if what can be known is limited to what is said by a proposition, rather than what is shown, then there are things that can be shown, but which we cannot be said to know. If that is the case, his first statement does not imply there are things that we can know (and be shown), since what is shown is unknowable, in the sense we cannot say what it is, in a proposition of the form 'S knows that p'.