I think these are all discussions that started from my position that any belief in qualia is fundamentally religious in nature and covered a lot of interesting ground about the foundations of philosophy from there (you can track the threads back if you so desire), so I'd just like to get out of the way that, yes, that was me, yes, I do believe that, and yes, I do like science, though I'm not going to rigorously defend it beyond being a favored intellectual curiousity.
the scientifically minded can legitimately only believe in science
(not philosophy), and what is "robust and reliable", it's just that
they don't prove it's "true", only that their position is consistent
I can't speak for the scientifically minded in general, but I don't think it's that difficult of an argument to say that:
- Any reason to believe in science is necessarily philosophical in
Moreover, as I also don't think it's unreasonable to take science as anything other than a subset of philosophy with fixed rather than free assumptions, I would say that rather than the scientifically minded being in opposition to philosophy, they are rather functioning under a sort of philosophy with fixed permissions, namely that knowledge must be gained through the scientific method.
Can they argue that others should do likewise without assuming articles of faith or intuition?
While I don't think it would be impossible to construct an argument, I really do think it will come down to basic assumptions that can neither be proved or disproved.
Given that no-one believes and behaves as if they only believe in science, is tu quoque a sound retort here, or not?
I don't believe that anyone has every behaved completely consistently with any philosophy so heavily prescribed as science (with the possible exception of some religious figures, which given the nature of this discussion I won't dismiss as reasonable arguments) so I wouldn't find this argument reasonable.
However, if there were somehow a clear way to determine that no effort had been shown to live according to these precepts then I believe there may be more room for argument, but the apparent difficulties may be sufficient to produce reasonable argument against even trying to live in accordance with a fixed philosophy.