Since consciousness is implicitly understood/used in the use of categories , could we consider it a "fundamental" functor ? Category Theory is very general (covering/useful) to many fields now including mathematics, logic, philosophy, biology, music theory, sciences in general. See j-paine.org/dobbs/why_be_interested_in_categories.html?
closed as unclear what you're asking by Joseph Weissman♦ Aug 31 '14 at 15:18
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Since consciousness is implicitly understood/used in the use of categories
None of the books and papers I've seen in Category Theory mentions consciousness. One could say that one needs to be consciousness to do mathematics or to comprehend it; but this goes for any project. However, MacClane wrote in the Introduction to Categories for the Working Mathematician
Now the discovery of ideas as general as these is chiefly the willingness to make a brash or speculative abstraction, in this case supported by the pleasure of purloining words from the philosophers: “Category” from Aristotle and Kant, “Functor” from Carnap (Logische Syntax der Sprache), and “natural transformation” from then current informal parlance
Kant uses his theory of consciousness to buttress Aristotles theory of categories; for example early on his Critique of Pure Reason he states that Space & Time are (categories) in the mind because they are the very conditions by which we experience. These categories are thus phenomenological (the name of which explicitly displays both the subjective character of say space as phenomena, and its objective character as theorised by Physics as logical).
The introduction of mathematics into the human sciences tends to be a minority position; for example Lacan introduces topology into psychology; had he been simply known for only this it seems safe to say that there would be no such field as Lacanian psychology; his importance lay in the re-invigoration of Freudian psychology by the introduction of the Mirror Stage; one might say, on the basis of intellectual history, that the same may go for the explicit introduction of category theory into the theory of consciousness.