I am looking for critique or good counter-arguments specifically for the Frankfurt cases.
The Frankfurt cases are in turn:
counterexamples to the "principle of alternative possibilities", or PAP, which holds that an agent is morally responsible for an action only if that person could have done otherwise.
The Frankfurt cases tells us that an agent is morally responsible for his actions, even if he could not have done otherwise. Here is one example:
Donald is a Democrat and is likely to vote for the Democrats; in fact, only in one particular circumstance will he not: that is, if he thinks about the prospects of immediate American defeat in Iraq just prior to voting. Ms White, a representative of the Democratic Party, wants to ensure that Donald votes Democratic, so she secretly plants a device in Donald's head that, if activated, will force him to vote Democratic. Not wishing to reveal her presence unnecessarily, Ms White plans to activate the device only if Donald thinks about the Iraq War prior to voting. As things happen, Donald does not think about Iraq prior to voting, so Ms White thus sees no reason to activate the device, and Donald votes Democratic of his own accord. Apparently, Donald is responsible for voting Democratic although, owing to Ms. White's device, he lacks freedom to do otherwise.
I have problem with this...If determinism is true, then Donald would not be free to choose either way. His intentions, values and so forth are predetermined to begin with. Just like in the example above. Donald is predetermined to act a certain way, but seems to have free will - in other words it is a case of compatibilism. However, why would his ability to free will and intentions matter at all for moral responsibility if he is already predetermined to bring about a certain action?