As the argument goes:
If God is omniscient, he must already know how he is going to intervene to change the course of history using his omnipotence. But that means he can't change his mind about his intervention, which means he is not omnipotent.
Is this premise contradictory? From the way I see it; this premise erroneously presumes that the free will is apodictically deducible as opposed to being a first cause, thus missing the mark as to what qualifies as a free will in the first place.
- If free will is a first cause.
- If first causes have no existence prior to their initiation, as first cause implies no relation to any other causes (Anything that exists)
- If the omnipotent has the ability to create first causes.
- If omniscience is defined to know everything or every state that exists or will exist (or could exist) through perfect deduction of all the causal relations of all that does exist.
Couldn't one be omniscient and omnipotent without facing any mutual inconsistencies?