According to Quine, the following sentence is literally nonsense:
∃x (Ralph believes that x is a spy)
Question: Exactly how does the sentence above devolve into non-sense according to Quine?
EDIT: Here is my understanding of Quine's argument. It's set in the context in which Ralph suspects that the man in the brown hat is a spy, and yet doesn't suspect that the mayor of his town is a spy. Under this scenario, we suppose that the man in the brown hat and the mayor of Ralph's town are in fact the same person.
Quine's Rejection of Quantification into Propositional Attitudes.
Consider the two sentences:
(1) ∃x(Ralph saw x wearing a brown hat and Ralph believes that x is a spy)
(2) ∃x(x is the grey-haired mayor of Ralph's town and Ralph does not believe that x is a spy)
Existential quantification has an objectual reading: (1) and (2) are true iff there exists an actual object (i.e., a man) that satisfices (1) and (2).
The only man which satisfies (1) and (2) is Ortcutt.
But the term Ortcutt has several different names: "Ortcutt", "the mayor of Ralph's town", "the man in the brown hat", and so forth.
Hence (1) and (2) are true, and seem to imply (absurdly) all of the following:
"Ralph believes that Ortcutt is a spy."
"Ralph does not believe that Ortcutt is a spy."
"Ralph believes that the mayor of his town is a spy."
"Ralph believes that the man in the brown hat is not a spy."
Hence quantification into propositional attitudes is deemed "nonsense".
Is this Quine's position in a nutshell?