There are, at present, two dominant ways to read Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP). One is called the irresolute reading, the other the resolute reading.
The irresolute reading takes what is called an inaustere view of nonsense: it takes Wittgenstein's propositions in the TLP to be nonsensical in that
they are trying to express what, according to Wittgenstein, can only be shown, e.g. propositions about the logical form of propositions.
- We could take the paradigmatically extreme irresolute reader to be Russell who, in his introduction, thought that sense of TLP could potentially be made in a meta-language.
The resolute reading on the other hand takes what is called an austere view of nonsense: this takes the propositions in the TLP to be actual, irredeemable nonsense,
they are no better than "squabble-squibble-squabble" or "Jabberwocky".
- In this sense the whole of TLP becomes a quasi-ironic argument against transcendental idealism.
- The locus classicus of this reading is Cora Diamond's The Realistic Spirit and much of the literature that has engaged with her work has served to clarify and sharpen the resolute reading.
As a result, several distinctions can be made between the two readings. For example, if we are irresolute then we take Wittgenstein to be a realist, whereas if we are resolute the question of realism/anti-realism does not arise.
Those two methods for interpreting aside, my question is whether there are other readings of the TLP that are not necessarily counterpoised around what view we take of nonsense. Are there ways to read the TLP that do not engage with the resolute/irresolute spectrum? Has any research been done in that direction?