I think you would love Rorty's "Philosophy And The Mirror Of Nature" ... he suggests Wittgenstein, Heidegger, and Dewey drop notions of representationalism, then for himself says he merges Sellers and Quine, becoming skeptical about epistemology rather than an epistemological skeptic. He notes, as most pragmatists do, "there's no difference that makes a difference" between justification and truth (see also: Albrecht Wellmer, ‘The Pragmatic Turn In Philosophy: Contemporary Engagements Between Analytic And Continental Thought’, State University Of New York, 2004, Page 96).
Justification, if knowledge is fallible, doesn't entail truth and so too any means or mode thereof; verification, evidence, reason, language, science, philosophy.
From a pragmatic, deflationary, or "epistemological-behaviorist" explanation, simply ask yourself what you mean in using the word "true" and under what conditions.
You'll find that no formula entails truth and then warrant becomes an effort toward utility and confidence. Consider that warrant entails entitlements as well as justification. Consider next that for example, one may be ethically obligated to dismiss well-justified propositions if, for instance, we hold the coherentist view of truth and said proposition is too foreign to one's existing body of knowledge and beliefs and experience.