Yes and yes.
Certainly many subsequent philosophers have pointed out "major flaws" in the Critique of Pure Reason and in Kant's assumptions generally. Fichte and Hegel disputed his use of the "thing-in-itself," Moore, Russell, and many in the Anglo-American camp brutally repudiated his "outmoded" idealism. Much of modern philosophy would say that his idea of "universal" categories lacks realism, history, evolution, and any sense of cultural relativism. He is sometimes regarded as the very model of overweening Enlightenment values, imposing a static Eurocentric view upon the rest of humanity. Nietzsche, many existentialists, and postmodernists regard his deontic moralism as the epitome of cold, lifeless, duty-bound Protestantism.
Yet this only confirms his centrality. While his layers of idiosyncratic terminology are very frustrating and, one suspects, no longer entirely necessary, he remains of far more than historical interest. He is especially central to discussions of freedom and morality, but his turn to "transcendental critique" also remains methodologically powerful. Among those who might be called "Kantians" of a sort are Wittgenstein, Kuhn, and Rawls, to name only three. Personally, I am also interested in the line of that odd hybrid "Kantian Marxists," from Hilferding to Karatani.
I certainly agree with others that secondary texts are the best approach, while working through the original. I find the Kant, A Very Short Introduction by Roger Scruton to be quite a good start, though obviously limited and debatable. And I think it worth the investment to get A Kant Dictionary by Blackwell. It gives German word origins, assuming you'll be reading in English, and helps guide one through the dense maze of Kantian terms.
Finally, I would argue that one of the great virtues of grappling with Kant and his "transcendental idealism" today is that he provides a complex, nuanced, critical alternative to neuroscience, cognitive studies, AI, and other now-trending, supposedly naturalistic, approaches to human consciousness.