Mainstream analytic epistemology seems to take for granted that for S to know p, p must be true. I do not share this intuition. It seems that to be properly internalist about knowledge, one can't appeal to the truth of the propositions under discussion.

So my question is the following: Is there any literature (preferably peer-reviewed in reputable journals) on what a non-factive epistemology looks like?

  • Without much technical knowledge of it, I share that intuition. Is this a matter of who is judging 'knowledge'? I thought the framing is that an outside observer has (I'm avoiding 'knows' that 'p is true', and uses that to judge if entity X 'knows' that p is true. Can you, in an edit to your question, elaborate on your reasons for not assuming that 'p must be true' for someone to have knowledge of p?
    – Mitch
    Commented Dec 20, 2011 at 15:16

1 Answer 1


This is not meant to be a comprehensive answer, but the first thing that came to mind was a paper by Allan Hazlett, which won the Young Epistemologist Award in 2007 and was printed in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research last year (2010, 80:497-522) and is available in preprint form here, on "The Myth of Factive Verbs."

  • 2
    Thanks for this. Someone else suggested this paper to me on Google plus. I really must read it some time
    – Seamus
    Commented Dec 20, 2011 at 21:56

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