Tegmark in his paper, Consciousness as a state of matter appears as something as an outlier in the physics and philosophy literature in that he designates consciousness as a state of matter.
But this has again a precursor in Milsian Physics, in particular the 'soul atoms' of Lucretious:
Our spirit and our mind (anima and animus in Latin) are made of very, very fine atoms (the spirit permeates every part of our body, whereas the mind stays in one place) enabling us to breathe, perceive and move (animating us, in other words). They are composed of breath, heat, air and a fourth, nameless substance, of incredibly smooth, small atoms, that starts the motions of sensation in our bodies.
Of course Tegmarks speculations are rooted in the concepts of modern physics; but there is here undeniable to my untutored eye a link. He argues:
In this paper, I argue that recent progress in neuroscience has fundamentally changed this situation, and that we physicists can no longer blame neuroscientists for our own lack of progress. I have long contended that consciousness is the way information feels when being processed in certain complex ways ... i.e., that it corresponds to certain complex patterns in spacetime that obey the same laws of physics as other complex systems, with no “secret sauce” required.
It is of course the metaphysics of natural philosophy that determines that no 'secret sauce' is required; that all concepts are rooted materially (and atomistically broadly understood); one argument against this is the notion of qualia, and Democritus's solution was to consider that this can be reduced to irreducible atoms of qualia (hence his description of atoms of anima); is Tegmark following the same line, or is he arguing for a different conception of qualia? Or does he not touch upon this problem at all? Finally, given that Tegmark doesn't mention Lucretious, am I broadly correct in suggesting that his conception lies within Milesian Materialism?